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ABOLISH THE JUVENILE COURT:
YOUTHFULNESS, CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY, AND SENTENCING
POLICY
BARRY C. FELD*
I. INTRODUCTION
Within the past three decades, judicial decisions, legislative
amendments, and administrative changes have transformed the
juvenile court from a nominally rehabilitative social welfare
agency into a scaled-down, second-class criminal court for young
people.! These reforms have converted the historical ideal of
the juvenile court as a social welfare institution into a penal sys-
tem that provides young offenders with neither therapy nor jus-
tice. The substantive and procedural convergence between
juvenile and criminal courts eliminates virtually all of the con-
. Centennial Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. Ph.D. (Soci-
ology), Harvard University, 1973; J.D., University of Minnesota Law School, 1969;
B.A., University of Pennsylvania, 1966.
I am very grateful to Tom Bernard, Donna Bishop, Jeffrey Fagan, James Jacobs,
Kimberly Kempf-Leonard, Stephen Morse, Irene Rosenberg, Elizabeth Scott, Michael
Tonry, Andrew von Hirsch, and Frank Zimring for reviewing an earlier incarnation of
this article and generously suggesting ways to improve it. Of course, they bear no re-
sponsibility for my failure to heed their wise counsel. I presented an earlier version of
this paper at theJohn D. and Katherine T. MacArthur Foundation Conference on the
Future of the Juvenile Court, at the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, on
May 19, 1997.
I See Barry C. Feld, Criminalizing the American Juvenile Court, 17 CRIME & JUST. 197
(1993) (analyzing changes in procedure, jurisdiction, and jurisprudence of juvenile
courts) [hereinafter Feld, Criminalizing the AmericanJuvenile Court]; Barry C. Feld, The
Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L. REv. 691 (1991) (summary of proce-
dural and substantive convergence between juvenile and criminal courts) [hereinaf-
ter Feld, Transformation of Juvenile Court]; Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the
Principle of Offense: Punishment, Treatment, and the Difference it Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821
(1988) (punitive juvenile court sentencing practices) [hereinafter Feld, Punishment,
Treatment]; Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the Offense: Legislative
Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471 (1987) (punitive
policies in waiver statutes) [hereinafter Feld, Juvenile Waiver Statutes]; Barry C. Feld,
CriminalizingJuvenile Justice: Rules of Procedure for Juvenile Court, 69 MINN. L. REV. 141
(1984) (procedural convergence between juvenile and criminal courts) [hereinafter
Feld, CriminalizingJuvenileJustice].
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ceptual and operational differences in strategies of criminal so-
cial control for youths and adults. No compelling reasons exist
to maintain separate from an adult criminal court, a punitive ju-
venile court whose only remaining distinctions are its persisting
procedural deficiencies. Rather, states should abolish juvenile
courts' delinquency jurisdiction and formally recognize youth-
fulness as a mitigating factor in the sentencing of younger
criminal offenders. Such a policy would provide younger of-
fenders with substantive protections comparable to those af-
forded by juvenile courts, assure greater procedural regularity
in the determination of guilt, and avoid the disjunctions in so-
cial control caused by maintaining two duplicative and inconsis-
tent criminal justice systems.
My proposal focuses only on the criminal delinquency juris-
diction of juvenile courts because youth crime and violence
provide the impetus for most of the current public anxiety and
political responses.2 First, this article will describe briefly the
transformation of the juvenile court from a social welfare
agency into a deficient criminal court. Second, it will analyze
the inherent and irreconcilable contradictions between attempt-
ing to combine social welfare and penal social control in the ju-
venile court. Finally, once a state separates social welfare from
criminal social control, no role remains for a separate juvenile
court for delinquency matters. Rather, a state could try all of-
fenders in one integrated criminal court, albeit with modifica-
tions to respond to the youthfulness of younger defendants.
Adolescent developmental psychology, criminal law jurispru-
dence, and sentencing policy provide rationale to formally rec-
ognize youthfulness as a mitigating factor when sentencing
younger offenders. Moreover, the uncoupling of social welfare
from criminal social control also suggests a social policy agenda
more responsive to the needs of youth than the current version
of the juvenile court.
In Part II, I briefly analyze the social hist6ry of the juvenile
court and its subsequent constitutional domestication. I argue
that in the three decades since Gault, legal changes have altered
2Barry C. Feld, Volent Youth and Public Policy: A Case Study ofJuvenileJustice Law Re-
form, 79 MINN. L. Rrv. 965 (1995) (analyzing effect of increase in youth violence of
late 1980s on juvenile justice reforms) [hereinafter Feld, Violent Youth]; see also
HowARD N. SNYER & MEuSSA SIcaMUND, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VIcrIMs: A
NATIONAL REPORT (1995).
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juvenile courts' procedures, jurisdiction, and jurisprudence, and
increasingly render juvenile courts indistinguishable from
criminal courts. The convergence is reflected in the decrimi-
nalization of status offenders, the criminalization of serious of-
fenders via waiver to the criminal courts, and the increased
punitiveness in sentencing of ordinary delinquents. Despite ju-
venile courts' increasing and explicit punitiveness, however,
they still provide delinquents with fewer and less adequate pro-
cedural safeguards than those available to criminal defendants.
In Part III, I argue that the juvenile court's deficiencies reflect a
fundamental flaw in its conception rather than simply a century-
long failure of implementation. The juvenile court attempts to
combine social welfare and criminal social control in one insti-
tution, but inevitably subordinates the former to the latter be-
cause of its inherent penal orientation.
In Part IV, I propose to abolish the juvenile court and to
formally recognize youthfulness as a mitigating factor in crimi-
nal sentencing, thereby accommodating the lesser culpability of
younger offenders. Young offenders differ from adults in their
breadth of experience, temporal perspective, willingness to take
risks, maturity of judgment, and susceptibility to peer influ-
ences. These generic and developmental characteristics of ado-
lescence affect their opportunity to learn to be responsible and
to develop fully a capacity for self-control and provide a compel-
ling rationale for mitigation of sentences. I propose an explicit,
age-based "youth discount," a sliding scale of developmental
and criminal responsibility, as the appropriate sentencing policy
mechanism to implement the lesser culpability of younger of-
fenders.
Finally, I suggest a number of benefits that may accrue from
a formal recognition of youthfulness as a mitigating factor in an
integrated criminal justice system-enhanced protection of the
many younger offenders already being sentenced as adults, an
affirmation of responsibility, integration of records, and a more
consistent sentencing policy toward chronic younger offenders,
and, ultimately, honesty about the reality of criminal social con-
trol in the juvenile court.
[Vol. 88
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II. TRANSFORMED BUT UNREFORMED:
TE REGENT HISTORY OF THEJUVENiLE COURT
A. THE JUVENILE COURT
Many analysts have examined the social history of the juve-
nile court Ideological changes in cultural conceptions of chil-
dren and in strategies of social control during the nineteenth
century led to the creation of the juvenile court in 1899. 4 The
juvenile court reform movement removed children from the
adult criminal justice and corrections systems, provided them
with individualized treatment in a separate system, and substi-
tuted a scientific and preventative alternative to the criminal
law's punitive policies. By separating children from adults and
providing a rehabilitative alternative to punishment, juvenile
courts rejected both the criminal law's jurisprudence and its
procedural safeguards such as juries and lawyers. Judges con-
ducted confidential and private hearings, limited public access
to court proceedings and court records, employed a euphemis-
tic vocabulary to minimize stigma, and adjudicated youths to be
delinquent rather than convicted them of crimes. Under the
guise of parens patriae, the juvenile court emphasized treatment,
supervision, and control rather than punishment. The juvenile
court's "rehabilitative ideal" envisioned a specialized judge
trained in social science and child development whose empathic
qualities and insight would enable her to make individualized
therapeutic dispositions in the "best interests" of the child. Re-
formers pursued benevolent goals, individualized their solici-
tude, and maximized discretion to provide flexibility in
See, e.g., DAVID J. ROTHMAN, CONscIENcE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS
ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AMERIcA (1980) (discussing the social structural context
of Progressives' building of social welfare and social control institutions); ELLEN
RYERSON, THE BEST-LAID PLANS: AMERICA'S JUVENILE COURT EXPERMENT (1978) (im-
pact of social sciences on juvenile courts "rehabilitative" ideology); ANTHONY M.
PLATr, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY (2d ed. 1977) (discussing
the social history of origins of Cook County Juvenile Court); Francis A. Allen, Legal
Values and the Rehabilitative Ideal, in THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: ESSAYS IN
LAWAND CRIMINOLOGY 25 (Francis A. Allen ed., 1964).
4JOHN R. SUtTON, STUBBORN CHILDREN: CONTROLUNG DELINQUENCY IN THE UNrIED
STATES, 1640-1981 (1988) (discussing the impact of changing social construction of
childhood on juvenile justice policies);Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-imagining Childhood and
Reconstructing the Legal Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV.
1083 (1991) (noting the social construction of childhood and its impact on juvenile
justice treatment ideology).
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diagnosis and treatment of the "whole child." They regarded a
child's crimes primarily as a symptom of her "real needs," and
consequently the nature of the offense affected neither the de-
gree nor the duration of intervention. Rather, juvenile court
judges imposed indeterminate and non-proportional sentences
that potentially continued for the duration of minority. Pro-
gressives used a variety of state agencies to "Americanize" immi-
grants and the poor; from its inception, juvenile courts provided
a coercive mechanism to discriminate between "our" children
and "other peoples' children"-those from other ethnic back-
grounds, cultures, and classes.5
Progressives situated the juvenile court on a number of cul-
tural and criminological fault-lines and institutionalized several
binary conceptions for the respective justice systems: either
child or adult, either determinism or free will, either treatment
or punishment, either procedural informality or formality, ei-
ther discretion or the rule of law. Serious youth crime chal-
lenges these dichotomous constructs. The recent procedural
and substantive convergence between juvenile and criminal
courts represent efforts to modify the Progressives' bifurcation
between these competing conceptions of children and crime
control.
B. THE CONSTITUTIONAL DOMESTICATION OF THEJUVENILE
COURT
In In re Gault,6 the Supreme Court began to transform the
juvenile court into a very different institution than the Progres-
sives contemplated. In Gault, the Supreme Court engrafted
some formal procedures at trial onto the juvenile court's indi-
vidualized treatment sentencing schema. Although the Court
did not intend its decisions to alter juvenile courts' therapeutic
' See W. NORTON GRUBB & MARVIN LAZERSON, BROKEN PROMISES: How AMERICANS
FAIL. THEIR CHILDREN 68-70 (1982) (discussing the selective application of parens pa-
triae ideology in a class-based society); ROTHMAN, supra note 3, at 222; PLATT, supra
note 3, at 36.
6 387 U.S. 1 (1967). For analyses of the Supreme Court's juvenile "due process"
decisions, see, e.g., Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice, supra note 1; Francis B. McCar-
thy, Pre-Adjudicatory Rights in Juvenile Court: An Historical and Constitutional Analysis, 42
U. Prrr. L. REv. 457, 459 (1981); Irene M. Rosenberg, The Constitutional Rights of Chil-
dren Charged with Crime: Proposals for a Return to the Not So Distant Past, 27 UCLA L. REV.
656 (1980).
' Gault, 387 U.S. at 31-57.
[Vol. 88
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mission, in the aftermath of Gault, judicial, legislative, and ad-
ministrative changes have fostered a procedural and substantive
convergence with adult criminal courts. Several subsequent Su-
preme Court decisions furthered the "criminalizing" of the ju-
venile court. In In re Wznship,8 the Court required states to
prove juvenile delinquency by the criminal law's standard of
proof "beyond a reasonable doubt." In Breed v. Jones,9 the Court
applied the constitutional ban on double jeopardy and posited a
functional equivalence between criminal trials and delinquency
proceedings.
Gault and Winship unintentionally, but inevitably, trans-
formed the juvenile court system from its original Progressive
conception as a social welfare agency into a wholly-owned sub-
sidiary of the criminal justice system. By emphasizing criminal
procedural regularity in the determination of delinquency, the
Court shifted- the focus of juvenile courts from paternalistic as-
sessments of a youth's "real needs" to proof of commission of a
crime. By formalizing the connection between criminal con-
duct and coercive intervention, the Court made explicit a rela-
tionship previously implicit, unacknowledged, and deliberately
obscured. And, ironically, Gault and Winship's insistence on
greater criminal procedural safeguards in juvenile courts may
have legitimated more punitive dispositions for young offend-
ers.
In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,'0 however, the Court denied to
juveniles the constitutional right to jury trials in delinquency
proceedings and halted the extension of full procedural parity
with adult criminal prosecutions. Without elaborating upon or
analyzing the distinctions, McKeiver relied upon the rhetorical
differences between juvenile courts' treatment rationale and
criminal courts' punitive purposes to justify the procedural dis-
parities between the two settings." Because McKeiver endorsed a
treatmentjustification for its decision, the right to ajury trial pro-
vides the crucial legal condition precedent to punish youths ex-
plicitly in juvenile courts. Several recent juvenile justice
legislative reforms provide some youths with a statutory right to
8 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
9 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
'0 403 U.S. 528, 541 (1971).
"i at 552.
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a jury in order to expand the punitive sentencing options avail-
able to juvenile courtjudges.12
C. THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE COURT
In the decades since Gault, legislative, judicial, and adminis-
trative changes have modified juvenile courts' jurisdiction, pur-
pose, and procedures and fostered their convergence with
criminal courts. These inter-related developments-increased
procedural formality, removal of status offenders from juvenile
court jurisdiction, waiver of serious offenders to the adult sys-
tem, and an increased emphasis on punishment in sentencing
delinquents-constitute a form of criminological "triage," cru-
cial components of the criminalizing of the juvenile court, and
elements of the erosion of the theoretical and practical differ-
13ences between the two systems. This "triage" strategy removes
many middle-class, white, and female non-criminal status of-
fenders from the juvenile court, simultaneously transfers persis-
tent, violent, and disproportionally minority youths to criminal
court for prosecution as adults, and imposes increasingly puni-
tive sanctions on those middle-range delinquent criminal of-
fenders who remain under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
As a result of these implicit triage policies, juvenile courts in-
creasingly function similarly to adult criminal courts.
1. Status Offenses
Legislative recognition that juvenile courts often failed to
realize their benevolent purposes has led to a strategic re-
trenchment of juvenile courts' jurisdiction over non-criminal
misconduct such as truancy or incorrigibility, behavior that
would not be a crime if committed by an adult. In the 1970s,
critics objected that juvenile courts' status jurisdiction treated
non-criminal offenders indiscriminately like criminal delin-
quents, disabled families and other sources of referral through
one-sided intervention, and posed insuperable legal issues for
2 See, e.g., Feld, Violent Youth, supra note 2, at 1039 (analyzing states' providing ju-
veniles with right to jury trial in order to enhance the punishment capacities ofjuve-
nile courts).
13 See Feld, Transformation ofJuvenile Court, supra note 1, at 696-722 (analyzing pro-
cedural and substantive transformation of the juvenile court); Feld, Criminalizing the
American Juvenile Court, supra note 1, at 227-54 (analyzing transformation of juvenile
court from informal welfare agency into a scaled-down criminal court).
[Vol. 88
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the court.14 Judicial and legislative disillusionment with juvenile
courts' responses to noncriminal youths led to diversion, dein-
stitutionalization, and decriminalization reforms that have re-
moved much of the "soft" end of juvenile court clientele. 5
These legislative and judicial reforms represent a strategic with-
drawal from "child saving," an acknowledgment of the limited
utility of coercive intervention to provide for child welfare, a re-
duced role in enforcing normative concepts of childhood, and a
diminished prevention mission.
2. Waiver ofJuvenile Offenders to Adult Criminal Court
A second jurisdictional change entails the criminalizing of
serious juvenile offenders as courts and legislatures increasingly
transfer chronic and violent youths from juvenile to criminal
courts for prosecution as adults.' Transfer laws simultaneously
" See H. TED RUBIN, JUVENILE JUSTICE: POLICY, PRACFE, AND LAW (2d ed. 1985)
(states traditionally treated status offenses as a form of delinquency, detained and
confined status delinquents in the same institutions as criminal delinquents); JOEL F.
HANDLER & JULIE ZATZ, NErrHER ANGELS NOR THIEVES: STUDIES IN
DEINSTITUFIONILIKInON OF STATUS OFFENDERS (1982) (observing that intractable fam-
ily disputes diverted scarce judicial resources from other tasks, and exacerbated
rather than ameliorated family conflict); Meda Chesney-Lind, Judical Paternalism and
the Female Status Offender: Training Women to Know Their Place, 23 CRIME & DELINQ. 121
(1977); Al Katz & Lee E. Teitelbaum, PINS Jurisdiction, the Vagueness Doctrine, and the
Rule of Law, 53 IND. L.J. 1 (1978) (concluding thatjudges exercise of standardless dis-
cretion to regulate noncriminal misconduct had a disproportionate impact on female
juveniles); Meda Chesney-Lind, Girls and Status Offenses: Is Juvenile Justice Still Sexist?,
20 CRm.JuST. ABsRACr 144 (1988); R. Hale Andrews, Jr., & Andrew H. Cohn, Ungov-
ernability: The Unjustifiable Jurisdiction, 83 YALE LJ. 1383 (1974) (discussing legal issues
of void for vagueness, equal protection and procedural justice).
"' Malcolm W. Klein, Deinstitutionalization and Diversion ofJuvenile Offenders: A Litany
of Impediments, 1 CRIME &JUST. 145 (1979) (implementation of diversion reforms and
their possible "net-widening" effects). Federal prohibitions on secure confinement of
noncriminal youths provided the impetus to deinstitutionalize status offenders. See 42
U.S.C. § 5633(a) (12) (A) (1995). Deinstitutionalization also provided the impetus to
transfer many middle-class, white, and female youths whom the juvenile justice system
formerly handled as status offenders into the private sector system of mental health
and chemical dependency treatment and confinement. See, e.g., IRA M. SCHWARTZ,
(IN)JusncE FORJUVENILES (1989); Lois A. Weithorn, Mental Hospitalization of Trouble-
some Youth: An Analysis of Skyrocketing Admission Rates, 40 STAN. L. REv. 773 (1988).
" Although the technical and administrative details of states' transfer legislation
vary considerably, judicial waiver, legislative offense exclusion, and prosecutorial
choice of forum represent the three general types of waiver statutes that jurisdictions
employ both singly and in combination. See, e.g., SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 2, at
85-89; PATRICIA TORBET ET AL., STATE RESPONSES TO SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE
CRIME 6 (1996); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, JI.VENILEJUSTCE: JUVENILES PROCESSED
IN CRIMINAL COURT AND CASE DISPOSITIONS (1995) [hereinafter JUVENILE JUSTICE];
Feld, Juvenile Waiver Statutes, supra note 1, at 503-19; Francis B. McCarthy, The Serious
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attempt to resolve both fundamental crime control issues and
the ambivalence embedded in our cultural construction of
youth. The jurisprudential conflicts reflect many of the current
sentencing policy debates: the tensions between rehabilitation
or incapacitation and retribution, between basing decisions on
characteristics of the individual offender or the seriousness of
the offense, between discretion and rules, and between inde-
terminacy and determinacy. Waiver laws attempt to reconcile
the contradictions posed when the child is a criminal and the
criminal is a child. What legal processes, crime control policies,
and substantive criteria best enable decision-makers to select
from among the competing cultural images of youths as respon-
sible and culpable offenders and as immature and salvageable
children?
In most states, judges decide whether a youth is a criminal
or a delinquent in a waiver hearing and base their discretionary
assessments on a juvenile's "amenability to treatment" or,,17
"dangerousness. The inherent subjectivity of waiver criteria
permits a variety of racial inequalities and geographic disparities
Offender and Juvenile Court Reform: The Case for Prosecutorial Waiver ofJuvenile Court Juris-
diction, 38 ST. Louis U. L.J. 629 (1994) (juvenile and criminal courts share concurrent
jurisdiction over certain ages and offenses, typically older youths and serious crimes
and prosecutors exercise their discretion to select the juvenile or adult status for
youths); Franklin E. Zimring, The Treatment of Hard Cases in Americanjuvenile Justice: In
Defense of Discretionary Waiver, 5 NoTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 267 (1991);
Charles W. Thomas & Shay Bilchik, Prosecuting Juveniles in Criminal Courts: A Legal and
Empirical Analysis, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRiMNOLOGY 439 (1985); Eric Fritsch & Craig
Hemmens, Juvenile Waiver in the United States 1979-1995: A Comparison and Analysis of
State Waiver Statutes, Juv. & FAM. CT.J., Summer 1995, at 17.
17 In Kent v. United States, the United States Supreme Court formalized the waiver
process, and required juvenile courts to provide youths with some procedural due
process protections, such as a fair hearing, assistance of counsel, access to social inves-
tigations and records, and written findings and conclusions. 383 U.S. 541, 554-57
(1966). Although the Supreme Court decided Kent on procedural "due process"
grounds, it appended to its opinion a list of substantive criteria that juvenile court
judges might consider. Id. at 566-67. Legislatures specify "amenability" waiver criteria
with varying degrees of precision, and frequently adopt the general and contradictory
list of factors appended to the Kent opinion.
Proponents ofjudicial waiver emphasize its consistency with juvenile courts' reha-
bilitative sentencing philosophy and contend that individualized judgments provide
an appropriate balance of flexibility and severity. See, e.g.,Jeffrey Fagan, Social and Le-
gal Policy Dimensions of ViolentJuvenile Crime, 17 CItM.JUST. & BEHAv. 93 (1990). Critics
object that juvenile court judges lack valid or reliable clinical tools with which to as-
sess youths' amenability to treatment or to predict dangerousness. See, e.g., Barry C.
Feld, Reference ofJuvenile Offenders for Adult Prosecution: The Legislative Alternative to Ask-
ing Unanswerable Questions, 62 MINN. L. REv. 515 (1978).
[Vol. 88
1997] ABOLISH THEJUVEN"LE COURT
to occur when judges attempt to interpret and apply these vague
laws. Judicial discretion also frustrates rational social control
and confounds criminal courts' response to young career crimi-
nals. 9 A "lack of fit" between judicial waiver decisions and
The subjective nature of waiver decisions and the lack of objective indicators or
scientific tools with which to classify youths allows judges to make unequal and dispa-
rate rulings without any effective procedural or appellate checks. DONNA HAMPARIAN
ET AL., YouTH IN ADULT CouxTs: BETWEEN Two WoRLDs 102-07 (1982) (nationwide
state-by-state and intra-state analyses reported enormous variations in both the rates
of waiver and the types of cases transferred); Jeffrey Fagan & Elizabeth Piper
Deschenes, Determinants of Judicial Waiver Decisions for Violent Juvenile Offenders, 81 J.
CRim. L. & CRMNOLOGy 314 (1990) (analyzing waiver decisions involving a sample of
violent youths in four different jurisdictions, controlling for both offense and of-
fender variables, and concluding that no uniform criteria guided transfer decisions).
Within a single jurisdiction, judges cannot administer, interpret, or apply discretion-
ary waiver statutes consistently from county to county or from court to court. See
Barry C. Feld, Bad Law Makes Hard Cases: Reflections on Teen-Aged Axe-Murderers, Judicial
Activism, and Legislative Default, 8 J.L. & INEQUAITY 1, 41-46 (1989) (rural judges
waive jurisdiction over youths more readily than urban judges transfer similarly-
situated offenders); Tammy Meredith Poulos & Stan Orchowsky, Serious Juvenile Of-
fenders: Predicting the Probability of Transfer to Criminal Court, 40 CRIME & DEuNQ. 3, 14
(1994).
Marcy Podkopacz and I analyzed waiver decisions by several judges in a single judi-
cial locale and reported that "the various judges within the same urban county and
court applied the same law and decided cases of similarly-situated offenders signifi-
cantly differently." Marcy Rasmussen Podkopacz & Barry C. Feld,Judicial WaiverPoliy
and Practice: Persistence, Seriousness and Race, 14J.L. & INEQUA=TY 73, 172 (1995) [here-
inafter Podkopacz & Feld, Judicial Waiver Policy]. These judicial differences influ-
enced both the characteristics of youths waived or retained and the subsequent
sentences imposed upon them as juveniles or adults. See also Marcy Rasmussen Pod-
kopacz & Barry C. Feld, The End of the Line: An Empirical Study ofJudicial Waiver, 86 J.
CRIm. L. & CRIMNOLOGY 449 (1996) [hereinafter Podkopacz & Feld, End of the Line].
In addition to justice by geography and by judicial idiosyncrasy, a youth's race also
may affect waiver decisions. See, e.g., Feld, Vwlent Youth, supra note 2, at 1009-10; Jef-
frey Fagan et al., Racial Determinants of the Judicial Transfer Decision: Prosecuting Violent
Youth in Criminal Cour 33 CRIME & DEuNQ. 259, 263 (1987) (study of violent youths
finding substantial disparities in the rates of transfers of minority and white offend-
ers); Joel P. Eigen, The Determinants and Impact ofJursdictional Transfer in Philadelphia,
in READINGS iN PUBLic POLIcY (John C. Hall et al. eds., 1981); Joel P. Eigen, Punishing
Youth Homicide Offenders in Philadelphia, 72J. Cm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1072 (1981) (in-
ter-racial effect in transfer decisions in Philadelphia, judges waived more readily black
youths with white victims than other offender-victim patterns). A four state analysis in
which the effects of race on judicial waiver decisions would be controlled found that
"blacks were more likely than whites to have their cases waived for violent, property,
and drug offenses." JUvENaEjuSTICE, supra note 16, at 59.
" Juvenile and criminal courts' sentencing policies may often work at cross-
purposes and frustrate rather than harmonize responses to serious young offenders
who move between the two systems. The correlation between age and criminal activ-
ity makes the currentjurisdictional bifurcation especially problematic because youths'
rates of offending peak in mid- to late-adolescence exactly at the juncture between
the juvenile and criminal justice systems. Moreover, criminal-career research indi-
cates that young offenders do not "specialize" in particular types of crime, that serious
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criminal court sentencing practices often produces a "punish-
ment gap" that allows many chronic and active young criminals
to fall between the cracks of the two systems.20 By contrast, when
judicial waiver decisions, legislatively excluded offenses, or
prosecutorial charging decisions focus on violent young offend-
ers, these youths often receive substantially longer sentences as
crime occurs within an essentially random pattern of persistent delinquent behavior,
and that a small number of chronic delinquents commit many of the offenses and
most of the violent offenses perpetrated by juveniles. See generally CRIMINAL CAREERS
AND "CAREER CRINALS" (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., 1986) [hereinafter CRImNAL
CAREERS]; David P. Farrington, Age and Crime, 7 CRIME &JUST. 189 (1986); Peter W.
Greenwood, Dfferences in Criminal Behavior and Court Responses Among Juvenile and
Young Adult Defendants, 7 CRIME &JuST. 151 (1986);Joan Petersilia, Criminal Career Re-
search: A Review of Recent Evidence, 2 CRIME &JUST. 321 (1980).
2nJuvenile court waiver criteria and criminal court sentencing practices often lack
congruence. Criminal courts impose relatively lenient adult dispositions because ju-
venile courtjudges waived only about one-third of youths for offenses against the per-
son and transferred the largest proportion of juveniles for property offenses such as
burglary. ELLEN NIMICK ET AL., JUVENILE COURT WAIVER: A STUDY OFJUVENI.E COURT
CASES TRANSFERRED TO CRIMINAL COURT 2-3 (1986) (in 1982, prosecutors charged only
a third (34.3%) of all youth waived to criminal court with an index violent offense, a
greater percentage with an index property offense (40.3%), and one-quarter (25.4%)
with less serious non-index offenses).
Despite the dramatic rise in violent youth crime in the late 1980s and early 1990s,
between 1988 and 1992juvenile courtjudges continued to transfer the largest plural-
ity of youths for property offenses (45%), and only about one-third (34%) ofjuveniles
for violent crimes against the person. SNYDER & SICHMUND, supra note 2, at 154. Only
in 1993, for the first time, did the proportion of judicially waived violent offenders
(42%) exceed that of property offenders (38%). Id. at 29.
The nature of the offenses transferred and the youthfulness of the offenders af-
fected their criminal court sentences. See PETER W. GREENWOOD ET AL., FACTORS
AFFECTING SENTENCE SEVERITY FOR YOUNG ADULT OFFENDERS 12-14 (1984) (youths
benefited from informal lenient sentencing policies in adult courts); HAMPARIAN ET
AL., supra note 18, at 112 (criminal courts subsequently fined or placed on probation
the majority (54%) of juveniles judicially transferred); JAMES P. HEUSER, JUVENILES
ARRESTED FOR SERIOUS FELONY CRIMES IN OREGON AND "REMANDED" TO ADULT CRIMINAL
COURTS: A STATISICAL STUDY (1985) (Oregon judges transferred majority of youths
for property offenses rather than violent offenses; criminal courts incarcerated only
55% of the convicted youths; nearly two-thirds of the waived youths received about
the same sentences that juvenile courts would impose on juveniles with prior records
or convicted of felonies); L. Kay Gillespie & Michael D. Norman, Does Certification
Mean Prison: Some Preliminary Findings from Utah, JUV. & FAM. Cr. J., Fall 1984, at 23
(Utah prosecutors did not charge the majority ofjuveniles transferred with violent of-
fenses; courts did not imprison a majority of those convicted as adults); MA. Bortner,
Traditional Rhetoric, Organizational Realities: Remand ofJuveniles to Adult Court, 32 CRIME
& DELiNQ. 53 (1986) (adult criminal courts sentenced to prison less than one-third
(30.8%) of 214 transferred juveniles convicted in adult proceedings); Podkopacz &
Feld, Judicial Waiver Policy, supra note 18, at 164 ("the juvenile court sentenced youths
found delinquent for non-presumptive, property offenses for terms longer than their
adult counterparts").
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criminals than do their delinquent counterparts who remain in
juvenile court simply because of their new-found "adult" status."
In response to the rise in youth homicide and gun violence
in the late-1980s, almost every state has amended its waiver stat-
utes and other provisions of their juvenile codes in a frantic ef-
fort to "get tough" and to stem the tide.22 These recent changes
signal a fundamental inversion in juvenile court jurisprudence
from treatment to punishment, from rehabilitation to retribu-
tion, from immature child to responsible criminal. Legislatures
increasingly use age and offense criteria to redefine the
boundaries of adulthood, coordinate juvenile transfer and adult
sentencing practices, and reduce the "punishment gap." The
common over-arching legislative strategy reflects ajurispruden-
tial shift from the principle of individualized justice to the principle
of offense, from rehabilitation to retribution, and an emphasis on
the seriousness of the offense rather than judges' clinical as-
sessments of offenders' "amenability to treatment." State legis-
lative amendments use offense criteria either as dispositional
guidelines to structure and limit judicial discretion, to guide
" Waiver statutes that use offense criteria to target violent offenders, that grant
prosecutors discretion to choose the forum, or that exclude serious and violent of-
fenses from juvenile court jurisdiction, increase the likelihood that young offenders
will receive significant sentences as adults. GREENWOOD ET AL, supra note 20, at 12-14
(when criminal courtjudges in Los Angeles sentenced juveniles tried as adults, gravity
or violence of the crime rather than the age or record of the offender determined the
sentence); Carole Wolff Barnes & Randal S. Franz, Questionably Adult: Determinants and
Effects of the Juvenile Waiver Decision, 6 Jusr. Q. 117 (1989) (youths transferred and
convicted for violent crimes received substantially greater punishment based solely on
the seriousness of the present offense than did youths retained in juvenile court or
transferred as chronic property offenders); Gary Rudman et al., Violent Youth in Adult
Court: Process and Punishment, 2 CRIME & DE INQ. 75, 88-89 (1986) (criminal courts in-
carcerated over 90% of waived violent youths and imposed sentences five-times longer
than those given to youths with similar offense characteristics but over whom the ju-
venile courts retained jurisdiction); Podkopacz & Feld, judicial Waiver Policy, supra
note 18, at 159-66; Podkopacz & Feld, End of the Line, supra note 18, at 485-89 (crimi-
nal courts sentenced the violent young "adults" to terms about five-times longer than
those received by violentjuveniles sentenced as delinquents).
On the escalation of youth homicide rates in the 1980s, see generally Alfred
Blumstein & Daniel Cork, Linking Gun Availability to Youth Gun Viwlence, 59 L w &
CONIT'm. PROBs. 5 (1996); Franklin E. Zimring, Kids, Guns, and Homicide: Policy Notes
on an Age-Specific Epidemic, 59 LAw & CONTEM'. PROBs. 25 (1996); Alfred Blumstein,
Youth Viwlence, Guns, and the llicit-Drug Industy, 86 J. Cm. L. & CRM iNoLoGY 10
(1995). In reaction to this increase, since 1992, 48 of the 51 states and the District of
Columbia have amended various aspects of their juvenile codes, sentencing statutes,
and transfer laws to "get tough" on youths who commit serious or violent crimes.
TORBETETAL., supra note 16, at 3-4.
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prosecutorial charging decisions, or automatically to exclude
certain youths from juvenile courtjurisdiction.2
Regardless of the details of these legislative strategies, the
efforts to "crack down" and to "get tough" repudiate rehabilita-
tion and judicial discretion, narrowjuvenile courts' jurisdiction,
base youths' "adult" status increasingly on the offense charged,
and reflect a shift toward more retributive sentencing policies.
Whether the legislature makes the forum decision by excluding
offenses, or the prosecutor does so on a discretionary basis via
concurrent jurisdiction, these laws reduce or remove both dis-
cretionary judicial authority and juvenile courts' clientele. Of-
fense exclusion rejects juvenile courts' philosophical premise
that they can aid youth and denies them the opportunity to try
without regard to the "real needs" of the offending youth. Fi-
nally, the legal shift to punish more young offenders as adults
exposes at least some youths to the possibility of capital pun-
ishment for the crimes they committed as juveniles.24
Although legislatures and courts transfer youths to criminal
court so that they may receive longer sentences as adults than
they could in the juvenile system, chronic property offenders
constitute the bulk of juveniles judicially waived in most states,
and they often receive shorter sentences as adults than do prop-
2About three dozen states recently have amended their judicial waiver statutes to
reduce their inconsistent application, to lessen intrajurisdiction disparities, and to
improve the fit between judicial waiver. TORBET ET AL., supra note 16, at 3-8. Legisla-
tures use offense criteria as a type of sentencing guidelines to control judicial discre-
tion, to focus on serious offenders, and to increase the numbers of youths waived.
Under concurrent-jurisdiction statutes, legislatures grant prosecutors more authority
to charge youths directly in criminal courts. Within the past decade, the use of this
waiver strategy has more than doubled to about a dozen states. Nearly two-thirds of
the states now exclude at least some serious offenses from juvenile court jurisdiction.
See SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 2, at 89; JUVENEJUSTca, supra note 16, at 8-9, 64-
93; Fritsch & Hemmens, supra note 16, at 29-32. Because most excluded offense legis-
lation targets serious violent offenses-murder, rape, kidnapping, or armed rob-
bery-youths identified by such provisions face the prospect of serious adult
consequences if convicted. As states continue to lower the ages of eligibility for trans-
fer of young offenders from 16 to 14 or 13, expand the lists of excluded offenses, and
grant to prosecutors authority to "direct file" more cases in criminal court, increasing
numbers of younger offenders appear in criminal court charged with serious crimes.
24 See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (upholding imposition of death
penalty on offenders aged 16 or 17 at the time of their crimes); VICrOR L. STREB,
DEATH PENALTY FORJUVENMLEs (1987); Victor L. Streib, The Juvenile Death Penalty
Today: Present Death Row Inmates Under Juvenile Death Sentences and Death Sen-
tences and Executions forJuvenile Crimes,Jan. 1, 1973 toJune 30, 1995 (1995) (un-
published manuscript, on file with author).
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erty offenders retained in juvenile court. By contrast, youths
convicted of violent offenses in criminal courts appear to re-
ceive substantially longer sentences than do their retained juve-
nile counterparts. 6  For youths and adults convicted of
comparable crimes, both types of disparities-shorter sentences
for waived youths than for retained juveniles adjudicated for
property offenses, and dramatically longer sentences for waived
youths than for retained juveniles convicted for violent crimes-
raise issues of sentencing policy fairness and justice. No coher-
ent policy rationales justify either type of disparities. Rather,
some youths experience dramatically different consequences
than do other offenders simply because of the disjunction be-
tween two separate criminal justice systems. The transition to
adulthood also occurs during the peak of youths' criminal ca-
reers. Thus, jurisdictional bifurcation undermines the ability of
the adult justice system to respond adequately to either persis-
tent or violent young offenders. Without an integrated record
system that merges juvenile with adult criminal histories, some
chronic offenders may "slip through the cracks" and receive in-
appropriately lenient sentences as adults.27
Podkopacz & Feld, Judicial Waiver Policy, supra note 18, at 159-66; Podkopacz &
Feld, End of the Line, supra note 18, at 485-89.
2 Podkopacz & Feld, Judicial Waiver Policy, supra note 18, at 159-66; Podkopacz &
Feld, End of the Line, supra note 18, at 485-89. See also Feld, Violent Youth, supra note 2,
at 1010-12.
2Juvenile and adult criminal courts' failure to maintain centralized repositories of
offenders' prior records of arrests and convictions or to integrate them across both
justice systems may frustrate sentencing of "persistent" career offenders when they
make the transition between the two systems. See DAVID P. FARRINGTON ET AL,
UNDERSTANDING AND CONTROLLNG CRuME: TOWARD A NEW ESEARCH STRATEGY 126
(1986) (confidentiality of juvenile records and failure to combine criminal histories
across both systems creates a disjunction that "serious offenders can exploit to escape
the control and punishment their chronic or violent offenses properly deserve"). In
many jurisdictions, criminal court judges often lack access to the juvenile component
of offenders' criminal histories because of the confidentiality of juvenile court rec-
ords, the functional and physical separation ofjuvenile and criminal court staff who
must collate and combine these records, sheer bureaucratic ineptitude, and the diffi-
culty of maintaining an integrated system to track offenders and compile complete
criminal histories across both systems. See Greenwood, supra note 19; Joan Petersilia,
Juvenile Record Use in Adult Court Proceedings: A Survey of Prosecutors, 72 J. GRIM. L. &
CRIMNOLOGY 1746 (1981); CRIMuNAL CAREERS, supra note 19, at 193 (sealing and purg-
ing juvenile court records impedes criminal courts' ability to identify career offenders
and to enhance their subsequent sentences).
Despite the traditional confidentially of and restricted access to juvenile courts re-
cords, many states increasingly use prior juvenile convictions to enhance adult sen-
tences. NEAL MLR, STATE LAWS ON PROSECUTORS' AND JUDGES' USE OF JUVENELE
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3. SentencingDelinquent Offenders
The same jurisprudential shifts from offender to the offense
and from treatment to punishment that inspire changes in
waiver policies increasingly affect the sentences that juvenile
court judges impose on serious delinquent offenders as well.
Progressive reformers envisioned a broader and more encom-
passing social welfare system for youths and did not circum-
scribe state power narrowly. Juvenile courts' parens pat riae
ideology combined social welfare with penal social control in
one institution, minimized procedural safeguards, and maxi-
mized discretion to provide flexibility in diagnosis and treat-
ment. They focused primary attention on youths' social
circumstances and accorded secondary significance either to
procedural safeguards or to proof of guilt or the specific of-
fense.28
RECORDS 1 (1995) (about half of states consider juvenile records in setting adult sen-
tences); TORBET ET AL., supra note 16, at 35-43. Several states' sentencing guidelines
and the federal sentencing guidelines include some juvenile prior convictions in an
adult defendant's criminal history score. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §
4A1.2 (1995); Feld, Violent Youth, supra note 2, at 1058. Under California's "three
strikes" sentencing law, "a prior juvenile adjudication shall constitute a prior felony
conviction for purposes of sentence enhancements;" criminal courts may use some
juvenile convictions to increase adult sentences. GAL. PENAL CODE § 667(d) (3) (West
1997); see also People v. Peterson, 40 Cal. App. 4th 1479 (1995) (using ajuvenile fel-
ony adjudication to double a young adult's sentence from 7 to 14 years). Most states'
sentencing guidelines weigh juvenile prior offenses less heavily than comparable
adult convictions and include, for example, only juvenile felonies committed after
age 16. See generally Barry C. Feld, Juvenile Court Legislative Reform and the Serious Young
Offender: Dismantling the Rehabilitative Ideal 69 MINN. L. REv. 141 (1981); Feld, riolent
Youth, supra note 2. Some states, however, do not distinguish qualitatively between
juvenile and adult prior convictions and include both equally in an offender's crimi-
nal history score. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4701 (1995).
The use of juvenile prior convictions to enhance adult sentences fosters greater
procedural convergence between the two justice systems. States' use of juveniles'
prior records implicates the "quality" of procedural justice by which juvenile courts
obtained those original convictions, because juvenile courts adjudicate many youths
delinquent without the assistance of counsel and most states deny youths access to a
jury trial. See BARRY C. FELD, JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN: THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND THE
JUVENILE COURTS 54-56 (1993); Feld, CiminalizingJuvenile Justice, supra note 1, at 189-
90; Feld, Violent Youth, supra note 2, at 1108-15; Barry C. Feld, The Right to Counsel in
Juvenile Court: An Empirical Study of When Lawyers Appear and the Difference They Make, 79
J. GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1185, 1217 (1989) [hereinafter Feld, The Right to Counsel in
Juvenile Court]; Barry C. Feld, In re Gault Revisited: A Cross-State Comparison of the Right
to Counsel in Juvenile Gourt 34 CRIME & DELINQ. 393, 400-03 (1988) [hereinafter Feld,
In re Gault Revisited].
"See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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The same public impetus and political pressures to waive
the most serious young offenders to criminal courts also impel
juvenile courts to "get tough" and punish more severely the re-
maining criminal delinquents, the residual "less bad of the
worst." Several indicators reveal whether a juvenile court
judge's disposition punishes a youth for his past offense or
treats him for his future welfare. Increasingly, juvenile court
legislative purpose clauses and court opinions explicitly endorse
punishment as an appropriate component of juvenile sanc-
tions.29 Currently, nearly half of the states use determinate or
mandatory minimum sentencing provisions that base a youth's
disposition on the offense she committed rather than her "real
needs" to regulate at least some aspects of sentence duration,
institutional commitment, or release. 0 Empirical evaluations of
2In the decades since Gault and McKeiver, more than 25% of the states have re-
vised the statement of legislative purpose in their juvenile codes to de-emphasize re-
habilitation and intervention in the child's "best interest" and to assert the
importance of public safety, punishment and accountability in the juvenile justice sys-
tem. Linda F. Giardino, Statutory Rhetoric: The Reality Behind Juvenile Justice Policies in
America, 5J.L. & POL'Y 223, 239-42 (1996) (detailed analysis ofjuvenile justice policy
embodied in juvenile code statutory preambles); Andrew Walkover, The Infancy De-
fense in the New Juvenile Court, 31 UCLA L. REV. 503, 523 (1984); Martin Gardner, Pun-
ishment and Juvenile Justice: A Conceptual Framework for Assessing Constitutional Rights of
Youthful Offenders, 35 VAND. L. REV. 791, 809-15 (1982).
For example, states have redefined theirjuvenile courts' purposes to: "provide for
the protection and safety of the public," CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 202 (West Supp.
1988); "protect society... [while] recognizing that the application of sanctions which
are consistent with the seriousness of the offense is appropriate in all cases," FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 39.001(2) (a) (West 1988); "render appropriate punishment to offend-
ers," HAw. REV. STAT. § 571-1 (1993); "protect[] the public by enforcing the legal ob-
ligations children have to society," IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-1-1 (Michie 1979);
"promote public safety [and] hold juvenile offenders accountable for such juvenile's
behavior," KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1601 (1997); and provide similar social defense ob-
jectives. Some courts recognize that these changes signal basic changes in philo-
sophical directions. See, e.g., In rejavier A., 206 Cal. Rptr. 386 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); In
re Seven Minors, 664 P.2d 947, 950 (Nev. 1983); State v. Lawley, 591 P.2d 772, 773
(Wash. 1979); State ex rel. D.D.H. v. Dostert, 269 S.E.2d 401 (W. Va. 1980).
" See TORBET ET AL, supra note 16, at 14-15; Feld, Punishment, Treatmen4 supra note
1, at 850-90; Jullianne P. Sheffer, Serious and Habitual Juvenile Offender Statutes: Reconcil-
ing Punishment and Rehabilitation within the Juvenile Justice System, 48 VAND. L. REV. 479,
500-06 (1995); Thomas C. Castellano, The Justice Model in the Juvenile Justice System:
Washington States Experience, 8 LAW & POLY 397, 405 (1986).
About half (22) the states use some type of offense-based criteria to guide judicial
sentencing discretion. Washington State adopted sentencing guidelines to impose
presumptive, determinate and proportional sentences based on ajuvenile's age, seri-
ousness of the offense, and prior record. WASH. REV. CODEANN. § 13.40.010(2) (West
Supp. 1988). Mandatory minimum sentencing provisions in other states typically use
age and offense criteria to define serious offenders and to prescribe lengths of sen-
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juvenile courts' sentencing practices indicate that the present
offense and prior record account for most of the explained
variance in judges' dispositions of delinquents, and reinforce
the criminal orientation ofjuvenile courts.3 1 Despite their penal
focus, however, the individualized discretion inherent in juve-
nile courts' treatment ideology is often synonymous with racial
discrimination.3 2 Finally, evaluations of conditions of confine-
tences or youths levels of security. TORBET ET AL., supra note 16, at 14-15; Sheffer, su-
pra, at 489-92. While nomenclatures differ among the states, these "therapeutic"
mandatory minimum sentencing laws typically apply to "violent and repeat offend-
ers," "mandatory sentence offenders," "aggravated juvenile offenders," "habitual of-
fenders," "serious juvenile offenders," or "designated felons." Compare ALA. CODE §
12-15-71.1 (1990), with COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-103 (1993). These laws identify vio-
lent and persistent offenders over whom juvenile courts do not waive jurisdiction ei-
ther because of their youthfulness or lesser culpability or complicity. More recent
legislative amendments add youths whom prosecutors charge with crimes involving
firearms or those who commit violent or drug crimes on school grounds to those eli-
gible for "special" sentences. See, e.g., ARI. CODE ANN. § 9-27-330(c) (Michie 1989).
The rate at which states amend their juvenile sentencing laws appears to have accel-
erated. "Since 1992, 15 States and the District of Columbia have added or modified
statutes that provide for a mandatory minimum period of incarceration of juveniles
committing certain violent or other serious crimes." TORBET ET AL., supra note 16, at
14. Similarly, the departments of corrections of many states have administratively
adopted security classification and release guidelines that use offense criteria to spec-
ify, proportional or mandatory minimum terms of confinement. See SUSAN GUARINO-
GIIEZZI & EDwARDJ. LOUGHRAN, BALANCINGJUVENILEJUSTICE 139-43 (1996); Martin
Forst & Martha-Elin Blomquist, Cracking Down on Juveniles: The Changing Ideology of
Youth Corrections, 5 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 323, 340 (1991).
" The Principle of Offense (present offense and prior record) accounts for most
of the variance in juveniles' sentences. Every methodologically rigorous study reports
that juvenile court judges, like criminal court judges, focus primarily on the serious-
ness of the present offense and prior record when they sentence delinquents. See,
e.g., Donna M. Bishop & Charles S. Frazier, Race Effects in Juvenile Justice Decision-
Making: Findings of a Statewide Analysis, 86 J. GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 392 (1996); Jef-
frey Fagan et al., Blind Justice? The Impact of Race on the Juvenile Justice Process, 33 CRIME
& DEuNQ. 224 (1987); Belinda McCarthy & Brent L. Smith, The Conceptualization of
Discrimination in the Juvenile Justice Process: The Impact of Administrative Factors and Screen-
ing Decisions on Juvenile Court Dispositions, 24 CRIMINOLOGY 41 (1986); Stevens H.
Clarke & Gary G. Koch, Juvenile Court: Therapy or Crime Control, and Do Lawyers Make a
Difference?, 14 LAW & SOc'YREV. 263 (1980).
"
2 After controlling for the seriousness of the present offense and prior record, in-
dividualized sentencing discretion often results in racial disparities. See KIMBERLY
KEMPF-LEONARD ET AL., MINORITIES IN JuvENLE JUSTICE 73 (1995); CARL POPE &
WILLIAM FEYERHERM, MINORITImS AND T=E JuVENIL JUSTICE SYSTEM 39-41 (1992);
Donna M. Bishop & Charles S. Frazier, The Influence of Race in Juvenile Justice Processing,
25J. RES. CRIME & DEUNQ. 242, 250 (1988); Barry Krisberg et al., The Incarceration of
Minority Youth, 33 CRIME & DEuNQ. 173, 185 (1987); McCarthy & Smith, supra note
31, at 49; Fagan et al., supra note 31. In 1988, Congress amended the Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention Act (]JDPA) to require states receiving federal funds to
assure equitable treatment on the basis, inter alia, of race and to assess the sources of
over-representation of minorities in juvenile detention facilities and institutions. 42
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ment and treatment effectivenesse belie any therapeutic "al-
ternative purpose" to juvenile incarceration. In short, all of
U.S.C. § 5633(a) (16) (1993). In response to theJJDPA mandate, a number of states
examined and found racial disparities in their juvenile justice systems. BARRY
KRIsBERG &JAMES AUSTIN, REINVENTINGJUVENILEJUSTICE 122-34 (1993); Carl E. Pope,
RacialDisparities injuvenileJustice System, 5 OVERCROWDED TIMES 1, 5 (1994) (after con-
trolling for legal variables, 41 of 42 states found minority youths over-represented in
secure detention facilities; 13 of 13 states that analyzed other phases ofjuvenile justice
decision-making found evidence of minority overrepresentation).
"Gault's decision to grant procedural protections recognized that incarceration of
delinquents and deprivation of their autonomy constituted elements of punishment.
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1967). Evaluations ofjuvenile correctional facilities in
the decades since Gault reveal a continuing gap between rehabilitative rhetoric and
punitive reality. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CHILDREN IN CONFINEMENT IN
LOUISIANA 1 (1995) (juvenile training schools confined predominantly black juveniles
in "punitive" facilities surrounded by high chain-link and razor wire fences; guards
physically abused inmates and locked them in isolation for long periods of time);
DALE G. PARENT ET AT., CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT: JUVENILE DETENTION AND
CORREatIONS FACaLrrEs (1994) (endemic institutional overcrowding in juvenile cor-
rectional facilities); STEVE LERNER, BODILY HARM: THE PATTERN Or FEAR AND VIOLENCE
AT THE CALiFORNiAYoUTH AUTHORriY (1986) (staff cannot protect inmates from being
beaten or intimidated by other prisoners); BARRY C. FELD, NEUTRALIZING INMATE
VIOLENCE: JUVENILE OFFENDERS IN INSTITUTIONS (1977) (violent and punitive facilities
in which staff physically punished inmates, and frequently failed to prevent inmates'
physical abuse and homosexual rape of other inmates); CLEMENS BARTOLLAS ET AL.,
JUVENILE VIctIMIZATION: THE INSTrrUTIONAL PARADOx (1976) (violent and oppressive
institutional environment for the "rehabilitation" of young delinquents); KENNETH
WOODEN, WEEPING IN TIE PlAYnIM OF OTHERS: AMERICA's INCARcERATED CHILDREN
(1976).
Martinson's generally negative observation that "with few and isolated excep-
tions, the rehabilitative efforts that have been reported so far have had no apprecia-
ble affect on recidivism," challenged the fundamental premise of therapeutic
dispositions and the juvenile court. Robert Martinson, Wat Works?: Questions and An-
swers About Prison Reform, PUB. INTEREST, Spring 1974, at 25. Evaluation studies pro-
vide minimal evidence that confining juveniles in institutions effectively treats rather
than punishes them or reduces recidivism rates. See generally TI-M REHABILIATION OF
CRIMINAL OFFENDERS (Lee B. Sechrest et al. eds., 1979); Steven P. Lab & John T.
Whitehead, From "Nothing Works" to "The Appropriate Works": The Latest Stop on the Search
for the Secular Grai4 28 CRMINOLOGy 405 (1990);John T. Whitehead & Steven P. Lab,
A Meta-Analysis of Juvenile Correctional Treatment 26 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 276
(1989); Steven P. Lab &John T. Whitehead, An Analysis ofjuvenile Correctional Treat-
ment, 34 CRIME & DEINQ. 60 (1988).
Evaluations of training schools, the most common form of institutional "treat-
ment" for the largest numbers of delinquents, report consistently negative findings.
See, e.g., MINNESOTA LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR, RESIDENTIAL FACaLITIS FOR JUVENILE
OFFENDERS 71-73 (1995) (analysis of recidivism rates of youths released from state
correctional and private facilities in 1985 and 1991 found that between 53% and 77%
continued their criminal careers into adulthood); JOHN C. STEIGER & CARY DIZON,
REHABILITATION, RELEASE, AND REOFFENDING: A REPORT ON THE CRIMINAL CAREERS OF
THE DIVISION OFJUvENILE REHABILITATION "CLASS OF 1982" 8 (1991) (over half of males
(58.8%) released from Washington State's residential facilities in 1982 reoffended
within one year, and more than two-thirds (67.9%) reoffended within two years);
LYNN GOODSTEIN & HENRY SONTHEIMER, A STUDY OF THE IMPAGr OF 10 PENNSLYVANIA
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these indicators consistently reveal that treating juveniles closely
resembles punishing adults. A strong, nationwide policy shift
both in theory and in practice away from therapeutic disposi-
tions toward punishment or incapacitation of young offenders
characterizes sentencing practice in the contemporary juvenile
court.
4. ProceduralJustice in juvenile Courts
Procedure and substance intertwine inextricably in juvenile
courts. The increased procedural formality since Gault coin-
cides with the changes in legal theory and administrative prac-
RESIDENTIAL PLACEMENTS ONJUVENILE RECIDIVISM (1987) (police rearrested more than
half of males (57%) released from 10 residential facilities in Pennsylvania in 1984 and
courts recommitted to residential facilities or prisons about one-quarter (23%) within
two years); PETER GREENWOOD & FRANKLIN ZIMRNG, ONE MORE CHANCE: THE PURSUIT
OF PROMISING INTERVENTION STRATEGIES FOR CHRONIC JUVENILE OFFENDERS 40 (1985)
(most state training schools "fail to reform... [and] make no appreciable reductions
in the very high recidivism rates, on the order to 70 to 80 percent, that are expected
for chronic offenders").
Proponents ofjuvenile rehabilitation strenuously resist the general conclusion that
"nothing works" in juvenile or adult corrections. See Gary B. Melton, Taking Gault Se-
riously: Toward a New Juvenile Court, 68 NEB. L. REV. 146 (1989). Advocates of "treat-
ment" offer literature reviews, meta-analyses, or program descriptions that stress that
some types of intervention may have positive effects on selected clients under certain
conditions. See GREENWOOD & ZIMRING, supra, at 70, ("we consider the 'nothing
works' conclusion to be simplistic overreaction to the empirical evidence"); Mark W.
Lipsey, Juvenile Delinquent Treatment: A Meta-Analytic Inquiry into the Variability of Effects,
in M.ETA-ANALYSIS FOR EXPLANATION: A CASEBOOK 97-98 (Thomas A. Cook et al. eds.,
1992) (positive treatment effects typically occur in small, experimental programs that
provide an intensive and integrated response to the multiplicity of problems that de-
linquent youths present); Albert R. Roberts & Michael J. Camasso, The Effects ofJuve-
nile Offender Treatment Programs on Recidivism: A Meta-Analysis of 46 Studies, 5 NOTRE
DAMEJ.L. ET'mcs & PuB. POL'Y 421, 437 (1991) (family therapy produced positive ef-
fects); D.A. Andrews et al., Does Correctional Treatment Work?: A Clinically Relevant and
Psychologically Informed Meta-Analysis, 28 CRIMINOLOGY 369, 384 (1990) (meta-analysis
reported positive effects when offenders received clinically appropriate psychological
treatments "according to the principles of risk, need, and responsivity"); Jeffrey Fa-
gan, Social and Legal Policy Dimensions of rolent Juvenile Crime, 17 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV.
93 (1990) ("the conclusion that 'nothing works' may be based more on the absence
of empirical evidence that treatment is effective than on conclusive evidence that
treatment does not work"); Rhena L. Izzo & Robert R. Ross, Meta-Analysis of Rehabilita-
tion Programs for Juvenile Delinquents, 17 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 134, 141 (1990) (treat-
ment strategies that developed juvenile offenders' cognitive skills appeared to show
positive effects); Paul Gendreau & Bob Ross, Reviviftcation of Rehabilitation: Evidence
from the 1980s, 4JuST. Q. 349, 395 (1987) ("it is downright ridiculous to say '[n]othing
works'"); Carol J. Garrett, Effects of Residential Treatment on Adjudicated Delinquents: A
Meta-Analysis, 22 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 287, 306 (1985) (meta-analysis of delin-
quency in residential treatment concluded that some programs produce positive re-
sults).
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rice from therapeutic, individualized dispositions toward more
punitive, offense-based sentences. Indeed, Gault's procedural
reforms may have encouraged these changes by legitimating
punishment. These changes contradict McKeive's premise that
therapeutic juvenile dispositions require fewer procedural safe-
guards than do adult criminal prosecutions and raise questions
about the quality of procedural justice injuvenile courts.3
Although the formal procedures of juvenile and criminal
courts have converged under Gaults impetus, a substantial gulf
remains between theory and reality, between the "law on the
books" and the "law in action." Theoretically, the Constitution
and state juvenile statutes entitle delinquents to formal trials
and assistance of counsel. But, the actual quality of procedural
justice differs considerably from theory; a gap persists between
"rhetoric" and "reality." Despite the criminalizing of juvenile
courts, most states provide neither special procedures to protect
youths from their own immaturity nor the full panoply of adult
procedural safeguards. Instead, states treat juveniles just like
adult criminal defendants when treating them equally places
youths at a practical disadvantage, and use less effective juvenile
court safeguards when those deficient procedures provide an
advantage to the state.
a. Jury
Although the right to a jury trial is a crucial procedural
safeguard when states punish offenders, the vast majority of ju-
risdictions uncritically follow McKeive's lead and deny juveniles
access to juries.m Because judges and juries decide cases and
apply Winship's "reasonable doubt" standard differently, it is eas-
ier to convict youths in juvenile court than in criminal court
with comparable evidence. s7 Moreover, McKeiver simply ignored
"FELD, supra note 27, at 54-56; Feld, In re Gault Revisited, supra note 27, at 400-03;
Feld, The Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court, supra note 27, at 1217. See also AMECAN
BAR ASS'N, A CALL FoRJUS'ncE: AN AsESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALrMY OF
REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS (Patricia Puritz ed., 1995) [hereinafter
A ALL FORJUSTICE].
m Feld, Punishment, Treatment, supra note 1, at 903-07; Feld, V'lent Youth, supra note
2, at 1099-1108.
'
7 Ainsworth, supra note 4, at 1124-25. See also PEERW. GREENWOOD ETAL., YoUni
CRIME ANDJUVENILEJUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA 30-31 (1983) ("it is easier to win a convic-
tion in the juvenile court than in the criminal court, with comparable types of cases").
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the reality that juries protect against a weak or biased judge, in-
ject the community's values into the law, and increase the visibil-
ity and accountability of justice administration.8  These
protective functions acquire even greater importance in juvenile
courts, which typically labor behind closed doors immune from
public scrutiny.
On the other hand, several states have recently enacted leg-
islation to increase the sentencing authority and punishment
capacities of juvenile courts. These "blended" sentences begin
with a youth's trial in juvenile court and then authorize the
judge to impose enhanced sentences beyond those used for or-
dinary delinquents. New Mexico,3 9 Minnesota,0 and Texas41
See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1968) (noting the protective
functions ofjury trial in criminal proceedings).
39 New Mexico created a three-tiered classification based on age and offense. N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 32A-2-3(C), (H), (I) (Michie 1995). Youths 16 or 17-years-old and
charged with first degree murder constitute "serious youthful offenders" whom courts
must sentence as adults. 'Youthful offenders" consist ofjuveniles aged 15 to 18-years-
of-age charged with legislatively designated aggravated, violent or repeated crimes.
All "delinquents" and "youthful offenders" in New Mexico enjoy a statutory right to a
jury trial in a juvenile court proceeding. Following a conviction as a "youthful of-
fender," the juvenile court conducts a quasi-waiver sentencing hearing to decide a
youth's "amenability to treatment or rehabilitation" and whether to sentence the ju-
venile as an adult or as a youthful offender. Id. § 32A-2-20(B) (1). The court may im-
pose either an adult criminal sentence or a juvenile disposition which extend until
age 21. Id. § 32A-2-20.
'0 Minnesota created an intermediate category for serious young offenders called
Extended Jurisdiction Juvenile (EJI) prosecutions. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.126 (West
1997); see also Feld, Violent Youth, supra note 2, at 1038-51. The statute restricts eligi-
bility for EMJ prosecutions to youths 16-years-of-age or older and charged with pre-
sumptive commitment to prison violent offenses, to youths whom judges decline to
waive to criminal courts and sentence instead as EJis, and to younger juveniles whom
judges determine in an EM hearing meet offense-based "public safety" criteria. Juve-
nile courts try and sentence these EM youths as juveniles but provide them with all
adult criminal procedural safeguards, including the right to a jury trial, because
judges impose both a juvenile delinquency disposition and an adult criminal sen-
tence, which the court stays pending compliance with the juvenile sentence. MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 260.126 (West 1997). Juvenile court jurisdiction continues until age 21
for EJJ youths, rather than terminating at age 19 as it does for ordinary delinquents.
If the EMU youth violates the conditions of the juvenile sentence, then the court may
revoke the probation and execute the adult criminal sentence.
4' In 1987, Texas enacted determinate sentences for youths convicted of certain
violent crimes or as habitual offenders in lieu of sentencing them either as ordinary
delinquents or seeking their transfer for adult prosecution. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§
53.045, 54.04(d) (3) (West 1996); Robert 0. Dawson, The Violent Juvenile Offender: An
Empirical Study ofJuvenile Determinate Sentencing Proceedings as an Alternative to Criminal
Prosecution, 21 TEX. TxcH L. REv. 1897 (1990); Robert 0. Dawson, The Third Justice Sys-
tem: The New Juvenile-Criminal System of Determinate Sentencing for the Youthful Violent Of-
fender in Texas, 19 ST. MAY'S L.J. 943 (1988). Juveniles receive the same procedural
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provide examples of three different versions of these enhanced
juvenile sentences for youths whom judges have not transferred
to criminal court for prosecution as adults. Although these
statutes differ in many details, all of the variants of "blended ju-
risdiction" provide these "intermediate" youths with adult
criminal procedural safeguards, including the right to a jury
trial. Once a state provides a youth with the right to a jury trial
and other criminal procedural safeguards, it preserves the op-
tion to punish explicitly, as well as to extend jurisdiction for a
period of several years or more beyond that available for ordi-
nary delinquents. Thereby the state also gains greater flexibility
to treat a youth. Moreover, these various enhanced sentencing
strategies recognize that age jurisdictional limitations ofjuvenile
courts create an undesirable binary forced-choice, either juve-
nile or adult, either treatment or punishment. Finally, these
statutes recognize the futility of trying to rationalize social con-
trol in two separate systems. These "blended" jurisdictional
provisions represent a significant procedural and substantive
convergence with an erosion of the differences between juvenile
and criminal courts. They provide a conceptual alternative to
binary waiver statutes by recognizing that adolescence comprises
a developmental continuum that requires an increasing array of
graduated sanctions for youths and procedural equality with
adults to reflect the reality of punishment.
b. Counsel
Procedural justice hinges on access to and the assistance of
counsel. Despite Gault's formal legal changes, the promise of
quality legal representation remains unrealized for many juve-
niles. In several states, half or less of all juveniles receive the as-
sistance of counsel to which the Constitution and state statutes
guarantees as do adult criminal defendants, including the right to a jury trial. Juve-
niles begin their determinate sentences in Texas Youth Commission facilities, and at
age 18, a court conducts a sentencing review hearing using Kent-like statutory criteria
to decide whether they will be retained within the juvenile correctional system for the
duration of their minority or complete their sentence as adults in the Texas Depart-
ment of CriminalJustice. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.11(k) (West 1996). In 1995, the
Texas legislature expanded from the original list of 6 crimes to 13 offenses for which
youths could receive determinate sentences, and increased the maximum length of
determinate sentences from 30 to 40 years. Id. §§ 53.045, 54.04(d) (3).
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entitle them.2 Moreover, rates of representation vary substan-
tially within states and suggest that differences in rates of ap-
pointment of counsel reflect judicial policies to discourage
representation. The most common explanation for why so
many juveniles are unrepresented is that judges find that they
waived their right to counsel.43 Courts typically use the adult le-
gal standard of "knowing, intelligent, and voluntary" under the
"totality of the circumstances" to gauge the validity of juveniles'
waivers of rights." Because juveniles possess less ability than
adults to deal effectively with the legal system,4 formal equality
results in practical procedural inequality.
III. THE INHERENT CONTRADICTION OF THEJUVENILE COURT
The foregoing jurisdictional, jurisprudential, and proce-
dural changes have transformed the juvenile court from its
original model as a social service agency into a deficient second-
rate criminal court that provides young people with neither
positive treatment nor criminal procedural justice. It effectively
punishes young offenders, but uses procedures under which no
adult would consent to be tried if she faced the prospect of con-
finement in a secure facility. The changes in procedures, juris-
diction, and sentencing policies reflect the contradictory roles
of juvenile courts and ambivalence about the social control of
young offenders. The Progressives sited the juvenile court on a
number of unstable cultural and criminological fault lines that
exacerbate the conflicted impulses engendered when a child is
a criminal and a criminal is a child. In this section, I contend
that juvenile courts' social welfare mission cannot and should
not be rehabilitated. In the next section, I advocate abolishing
", See FELD, supra note 27, at 54-56; Feld, In re Gault Revisited, supra note 27, at 400-
03; A CALL FORJUSTCE, supra note 35, at 19-27; see also GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
JUVENILE JUSTICE: REPRESENTATION RATES VARIED AS DID COUNSEL'S IMPAcr ON COURT
OUTcOMES 11-13 (1995) [hereinafterJUVENILEJUSTCE].
4 A CALL FORJUSTICE, supra note 35, at 25-27; Feld, CriminalizingJuvenileJustice, su-
pra note 1, at 169-90; Feld, The Right to Counsel in Juvenile Courts, supra note 27, at
1201-03.
"' See, e.g., Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979) ("knowing[]," "intelli-
gent[]," and "voluntar[y]" waiver of Miranda right to counsel under the "totality-of-
the-circumstances"); Feld, The Right to Counsel in Juvenile Courts, supra note 27, at 1201-
03.
See generally FELD, supra note 27; THOMAS Gmisso, JUVENILE' WAIVER OF RIGHTS:
LEGAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL COMPETENCE (1981); Thomas Grisso, Juveniles' Capacities to
Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical Analysis, 68 CAL. L. REV. 1134 (1980).
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the juvenile court and trying all offenders in one integrated
criminal court with modifications for the youthfulness of some
defendants.
A. SOCIAL WELFARE VERSUS PENAL SOCIAL CONTROL
The juvenile court treatment model constitutes an inappro-
priate policy response to young offenders. If we formulated a
child welfare policy ab initio, would we choose ajuvenile court as
the most appropriate agency through which to deliver social
services, and make criminality a condition precedent to the re-
ceipt of services? If we would not create a court to deliver social
services, then does the fact of a youth's criminality confer upon
a court any special competency as a welfare agency? Many
young people who do not commit crimes desperately need so-
cial services and many youths who commit crimes do not re-
quire or will not respond to social services. In short, criminality
represents an inaccurate and haphazard criterion upon which
to allocate social services. Because our society denies adequate
help and assistance to meet the social welfare needs of all young
people, the juvenile court's treatment ideology serves primarily
to legitimate the exercise ofjudicial coercion of some because of
their criminality.
Quite apart from its unsuitability as a social welfare agency,
the individualized justice of a rehabilitative juvenile court fosters
lawlessness and thus detracts from its utility as a court of law as
well. Despite statutes and rules, juvenile court judges make dis-
cretionary decisions effectively unconstrained by the rule of law.
If judges intervene to meet each child's "real needs," then every
case is unique and decisional rules or objective criteria cannot
constrain clinical intuitions. The idea of treatment necessarily
entails individual differentiation, indeterminacy, a rejection of
proportionality, and a disregard of normative valuations of the
seriousness of behavior. But, ifjudges possess neither practical
scientific bases by which to classify youths for treatment nor
demonstrably effective programs to prescribe for them, then the
exercise of "sound discretion" simply constitutes a euphemism
for idiosyncratic judicial subjectivity. Racial, gender, geo-
graphic, and socio-economic disparities constitute almost inevi-
table corollaries of a treatment ideology that lacks a scientific
foundation. At the least, judges will sentence youths differently
based on extraneous personal characteristics for which they
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bear no responsibility. At the worst, judges will impose haphaz-
ard, unequal, and discriminatory punishment on similarly situ-
ated offenders without effective procedural or appellate checks.
Is the discretion that judges exercise to classify for treat-
ment warranted? Do the successes of rehabilitation justify its
concomitant lawlessness? Do the incremental benefits of juve-
nile court intervention outweigh the inevitable inequalities and
racial disparities that result from the exercise of individualized
discretion? These questions require more sophisticated cost-
benefit policy analyses than Progressives' claims that "if we save
even one child, then it is worth it." Evaluations of the effective-
ness of juvenile court intervention on recidivism rates counsel
skepticism about the availability of programs that consistently or
systematically rehabilitate juvenile offenders. The inability to
demonstrate significant treatment effects may reflect either
methodological flaws, poorly implemented programs, or, in fact,
the absence of effective methods of treatment. Moreover, even
if some model programs do "work" for some offenders under
some conditions, fiscal constraints, budget deficits, and compe-
tition from other interest groups make it unlikely that states will
provide universally such treatment services for ordinary delin-
quents. In the face of unproven efficacy and inadequate re-
sources, the possibility of an effective rehabilitation program
constitutes an insufficient justification to confine young offend-
ers "for their own good" while providing them with fewer pro-
cedural safeguards than those afforded adults charged,
convicted, and confined for crimes.
The juvenile court predicates its procedural informality on
the assumptions that it provides benign and effective treatment.
The continuing absence or co-optation of defense counsel in
many jurisdictions reduces the likelihood that juvenile courts
will adhere to existing legal mandates. The closed, informal,
and confidential nature of delinquency proceedings reduces the
visibility and accountability of the justice process and precludes
external checks on coercive interventions. So long as the my-
thology prevails that juvenile court intervention constitutes only
benign coercion and that, in any event, children should not ex-
pect more, youths will continue to receive the "worst of both
worlds."
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B. FAILURE OF IMPLEMENTATION VERSUS CONCEPTION
The fundamental shortcoming of the juvenile court's wel-
fare idea reflects a failure of conception rather than simply a fail-
ure of implementation. The juvenile court's creators envisioned
a social service agency in a judicial setting, and attempted to
fuse its welfare mission with the power of state coercion. The
juvenile court idea that judicial-clinicians successfully can com-
bine social welfare and penal social control in one agency rep-
resents an inherent conceptual flaw and an innate
contradiction. Combining social welfare and penal social con-
trol functions in one agency assures that the court does both
badly. Providing for child welfare is a societal responsibility
rather than a judicial one. Juvenile courts lack control over the
resources necessary to meet child welfare needs exactly because
of the social class and racial characteristics of their clients. In
practice, juvenile courts subordinate welfare concerns to crime
control considerations.
The conflicted impulses engendered between concern for
child welfare and punitive responses to criminal violations form
the root of the ambivalence embedded in the juvenile court.
The hostile reactions that people experience toward other peo-
ples' children, whom they regard as a threat to themselves and
their own children, undermine benevolent aspirations and ele-
vate concerns for their control. Juvenile justice personnel si-
multaneously profess child-saving aspirations but more often
function as agents of criminal social control.
The juvenile court inevitably subordinates social welfare to
criminal social control because of its built-in penal focus. Legis-
latures do not define juvenile courts' social welfare jurisdiction
on the basis of characteristics of children for which they are not
responsible and for which effective intervention could improve
their lives. For example, juvenile court law does not define eli-
gibility for services or create an enforceable right or entitlement
based upon young peoples' lack of access to decent education,
lack of adequate housing or nutrition, unmet health needs, or
impoverished families-none of which are their fault. In all of
these instances, children bear the social burdens of their par-
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ents' circumstances literally as innocent bystanders. 46 If states
defined juvenile courts' jurisdiction on the basis of young peo-
ple's needs for social welfare, then they would declare a broad
category of at-risk children who are eligible for public assis-
tance. Such a policy would require a substantial commitment of
social resources and public will to children's welfare. 7
Instead, states' juvenile codes define juvenile courts' juris-
diction based on a youth committing a crime, a prerequisite
that detracts from a compassionate response. Unlike disadvan-
taged social conditions that are not their fault, criminal behav-
ior represents the one characteristic for which adolescent
offenders do bear at least partial responsibility. As long as juve-
nile courts define eligibility for "services" on the basis of crimi-
nality, they highlight that aspect of youths which rationally
elicits the least sympathy, and ignore personal circumstances or
social conditions that evoke a desire to help. Thus, the juvenile
courts' defining characteristic simply reinforces the public's an-
tipathy to young people by emphasizing that they are law viola-
tors.48 Recent changes in juvenile court waiver and sentencing
policies to emphasize punishment, "accountability," and per-
sonal responsibility further re-enforce juvenile courts' penal
foundations and reduce the legitimacy of youths' claims to
compassion or humanitarian assistance.
A century ago Progressive reformers had to choose between
initiating structural social reforms that would ameliorate ine-
quality and criminogenic forces, or ministering to the individu-
als damaged by those adverse social conditions. Driven by class
and ethnic antagonisms, they ignored the social-structural and
political-economic implications of their own structural theories
of delinquency. Instead they chose to "save children" and, inci-
46 GRUBB & LAZERSON, supra note 5, at 298-300; NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
LOSING GENERATIONS: ADOLESCENTS IN HIGH-RISK SETTINGS 48-56 (1993) [hereinafter
LOSING GENERATIONS].
17 DUNCAN LINDSEY, THE WELFARE OF CHILDREN 321-35 (1994); NATIONAL COMM'N
ON CHILDREN, BEYOND RHETORIC: A NEW AMERICAN AGENDA FOR CHILDREN AND
FAMIIES 369-90 (1991) [hereinafter BEYOND RHETORIC]; LOSING GENERATIONS, supra
note 46, at 235-56.
"' DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY: A STUDY IN SOCIAL THEORY
236-37 (1990) ("Of all the groups which make a claim upon public sympathy and fel-
low feeling, criminal offenders often seem to have the weakest claim and this is par-
ticularly the case if they are represented as a willful danger to the public, rather than
as inadequate, or maladjusted, or as themselves victims of social injustice.").
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dentally, to preserve their own power and privilege.49 "Child-
saving" satisfied humanitarian impulses without engendering
more fundamental social change. As a result, the juvenile court
welfare idea espoused social structural or deterministic explana-
tions of delinquent behavior and then individualized its sanc-
tions. On the one hand, to punish people for behavior that
society "caused" may lead to charges of hypocrisy. On the other
hand, to subscribe to deterministic explanations of behavior
undermines individual responsibility and erodes the expressive,
condemnatory function of criminal law.
A century later, we face similar choices between rehabilitat-
ing "damaged" individuals in a criminal justice system and initi-
ating more fundamental social structural change. In making
these choices, the juvenile court welfare idea may constitute an
obstacle to child welfare reform. The existence of a juvenile
court provides an alibi to avoid fundamental improvement.
Conservatives may deprecate the juvenile court as a welfare sys-
tem that fails to "crack down" or "get tough" and thereby "cod-
dles" young criminals. Liberals may bemoan its lack of
resources and inadequate options, none of which address the
underlying structural causes of crime or children's poverty. But
either stance is akin to sticking fingers in the dike while the
flood of adverse social indicators of youth pour over the top in a
torrent.50 Society collectively bears responsibility to provide for
the welfare of its children, and does so by supporting families,
communities, schools, and social institutions that nurture all
young people-not by cynically incarcerating its most disadvan-
taged children "for their own good." Neither juvenile court
judges nor any other criminal justice agencies realistically can
ameliorate the social ills that afflict young people or signifi-
cantly reduce youth crime.51
49 See ROmmAN, supra note 3, at 288-89; PLATt, supra note 3, at 137-45.
LOSING GENERATIONS, supra note 46, at 13-20; UNITED STATES DEP'T OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES, TRENDS IN THE WELL-BEING OF AMERICA'S CHILDREN AND YOUTH:
1996, 12-35 (1996).
"' Michael Tonry notes that:
[the resources of the criminal [and juvenile] justice system are few. The an-
swers to poverty, underemployment, and racial bias must be sought elsewhere, in
schools and social welfare programs and broad-based social policies. To look to
the criminal [and juvenile] justice system to solve fundamental social problems
would be foolish and doomed to fail.
MICAEL ToNRY, MAuGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME AND PUNISHMNT IN AMERICA 163
(1995).
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IV. YOUTHFULNESS, CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY, AND SENTENCING
POLICY: YOUNG OFFENDERS IN CRIMINAL COURTS
Once we uncouple social welfare from penal social control,
then no need remains for a separate juvenile court for young of-
fenders. We can try all offenders in criminal court with certain
modifications of substantive and procedural criminal law to ac-
commodate younger defendants. Some proponents of juvenile
courts properly object that criminal courts suffer from profound
deficiencies: crushing caseloads; ineffective attorneys; insuffi-
cient sentencing alternatives; coercive plea bargains; and as-
sembly-line justice. 2 Unfortunately, these shortcomings equally
characterize juvenile courts as well. 3 Others argue that because
no social or political will exists to reform or provide resources
for criminal courts, then juvenile court abolitionists must dem-
onstrate conclusively their irremediable bankruptcy before re-
mitting youths to the criminal courts that inspired their
creation. 4 In short, fewjuvenile court proponents even attempt
any longer to defend the institution on its own merits, but only
to justify it by comparison with criminal courts, which they con-
tend are worse. In this article, I do not propose simultaneously
to completely reform the criminal justice system, but rather only
to identify the sentencing policy issues raised when the criminal
is a child. Because legislatures, prosecutors, and juvenile court
judges already transfer increasing numbers and younger of-
fenders to criminal courts for prosecution as adults, formulating
a youth sentencing policy has considerable contemporary sali-
ence whether or not states abolish juvenile courts in their en-
tirety.
If the child is a criminal and the "real" reason for formal in-
tervention is criminal social control, then states should abolish
juvenile courts' delinquency jurisdiction and try young offend-
ers in criminal courts alongside their adult counterparts. But, if
the criminal is a child, then states must modify their criminal
" Irene Merker Rosenberg, Leaving Bad Enough Alone: A Response to the Abolitionists,
1993 Wis. L. REv. 163, 173; H. Ted Rubin, Retain the Juvenile Court?: Legislative Devel-
opments, Reform Directions and the Call for Abolition, 25 CRIME & DEuNQ. 281, 289 (1979).
-" FELD, supra note 27, at 283; Robert 0. Dawson, The Future ofJuvenile Justice: Is It
Time to Abolish the System?, 81 J. GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 136, 140 (1990); Feld, Crimi-
nalizing the American Juvenile Court, supra note 1, at 259.
" Leonard P. Edwards, The Juvenile Court and the Role of the Juvenile Court Judge, 43
Juv. &FAM. CT.J. 1, 19 (1992).
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justice system to accommodate the youthfulness of some defen-
dants. Before prosecuting a child as a criminal in an integrated
court, a legislature must address issues of substance and proce-
dure. Substantive justice requires a rationale to sentence
younger offenders differently, and more leniently, than older de-
fendants, a formal recognition of youthfulness as a mitigating fac-
tor in sentencing. Procedural justice requires providing youths
with full procedural parity with adult defendants and additional
safeguards to account for the disadvantages of youth in the jus-
tice system. Taken in combination, these substantive and pro-
cedural modifications can avoid the "worst of both worlds,"
provide youths with protections functionally equivalent to those
accorded adults, and do justice in sentencing.
Politically popular "sound-bites"--"old enough to do the
crime, old enough to do the time" or "adult crime, adult
time"-do not analyze adequately the complexities of a youth
sentencing policy. My proposal to abolish the juvenile court
constitutes neither a unqualified endorsement of punishment
nor a primitive throw-back to earlier centuries' views of young
people as miniature adults. Rather, it honestly acknowledges
that juvenile courts currently engage in criminal social control,
asserts that younger offenders in a criminal justice system deserve
less severe consequences for their misdeeds than do more ma-
ture offenders simply because they are young, and addresses
many problems created by trying to maintain binary, dichoto-
mous, and contradictory criminal justice systems based on an
arbitrary age classification of a youth as a child or as an adult.
Formulating a youth sentencing policy entails two tasks.
First, I will develop a rationale to sentence younger offenders
differently, and more leniently, than older defendants. Explicitly
punishing young offenders rests on the premise that adolescents
possess sufficient moral reasoning, cognitive capacity, and voli-
tional controls to hold them responsible and accountable for
their behavior, albeit not necessarily to the same degree as
adults. Developmental psychological research, jurisprudence
and criminal sentencing policy provide a rationale to explain
why young offenders deserve less severe consequences for their
misdeeds than do older offenders and justify formal recognition
of youthfulness as a mitigating factor. Secondly, I will propose a
"youth discount" as a practical administrative mechanism to im-
plement youthfulness in sentencing.
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A. SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE-JUVENILES' CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
Questions about youths' accountability or criminal respon-
sibility arise at two different stages in the justice system, either
when deciding guilt or when imposing a sentence. In the for-
mer instance, questions of responsibility focus on the minimum
age at which the state may find a person guilty of an offense. In
making judgments about criminal responsibility, the criminal
law's mens rea construct focuses narrowly on cognitive ability and
capacity to make choices and excludes from consideration the
goals, values, emotions or psychological development that moti-
vate a person's choices.5  In the absence of insanity, compul-
sion, or some cognizable legal excuse, any actor who has the
capacity to choose to act otherwise than the way she did pos-
sesses criminal responsibility. For questions of criminal respon-
sibility and guilt, the common law's insanity and infancy mens rea
defenses provide most of the answers. These doctrines excuse
from criminal liability only those who lack the requisite criminal
intent, the mens rea, because of mental illness6 or immaturity.
Because these mens rea defenses effectively excuse an offender
when the state cannot prove a crucial element of the offense,
i.e., criminal intent, the common law employs a very low cogni-
tive threshold-knowledge of "right from wrong"-to establish
criminal guilt. Knowledge of "right from wrong" entails only
minimally rational understanding, and infancy mens rea does not
provide an especially useful analytical prism through which to
view youthfulness as a "special circumstance.5 7 Even very young
"JAMES Q. WILSON, MORALJUDGMENT (1997); Sanford H. Kadish, The Decline of In-
nocence, 26 CAMBRIDGE LJ. 273 (1968).
6Joseph Goldstein andJay Katz argue that the "insanity defense" functions to sub-
ject to social control those whom traditional criminal law principles of mens rea might
otherwise excuse from liability. Joseph Goldstein & Jay Katz, Abolish the "Insanity De-
fense'--Why Not?, 72 YALE LJ. 853, 864 (1963) ("[Tlhe defense is not to absolve of
criminal responsibility 'sick' persons who would otherwise be subject to criminal sanc-
tion. Rather, its real function is to authorize the state to hold those who might be
found not to possess the guilty mind mens rea, even though the criminal law demands
that no person be held criminally responsible if doubt is cast on any material element
of the offense charged.").
" In the narrow mens rea-as-capacity formulation, any criminally responsible actor
who makes a blameworthy choice deserves the same punishment as any other person
who makes a comparable choice. Mens rea for guilt or as a criminal law grading prin-
ciple operates in a binary fashion either present or absent. In the mens rea-as-capacity
formula, virtually all youths over whom juvenile courts exercise jurisdiction possess
the cognitive capacity to distinguish between "right and wrong." If they do not, then
an insanity defense provides the appropriate context in which to litigate the issues of
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children may act purposefully and with knowledge of the
wrongfulness of their conduct.
Quite apart from decisions about guilt or innocence, indi-
vidual accountability and criminal responsibility also relate to
questions of disposition or sentence. Even if a court finds a
youth criminally responsible for causing a particular harm,
should the criminal law treat a fourteen-year-old as the moral
equivalent of a twenty-four-year-old and impose an identical sen-
tence, or should youthfulness mitigate the severity of the conse-
quences? "Old enough to do the crime, old enough to do the
time" provides an overly simple answer to a complex, normative,
moral, and legal question. If political "soundbites" do not cap-
ture adequately the complexity of a youth sentencing policy,
then on what principled bases should we distinguish between
the two in sentencing?
Contemporary juvenile courts typically impose shorter sen-
tences on serious young offenders than adult offenders con-
victed of comparable crimes receive. 8 These shorter sentences
enable young offenders to survive the mistakes of adolescence
with a semblance of life chances intact.5 9 The juvenile court rei-
fies the idea that young people bear less criminal responsibility
and deserve less punishment than adults. Shorter sentences
recognize that young people do differ somewhat from adults.
These differences stem from physical, psychological, or devel-
opmental characteristics of young people, and as by-products of
the legal and social construction of youth. Adolescents differ
from adults physically and psychologically, and their immaturity
affects their judgment. A formal mitigation of punishment
based on youthfulness comprises a necessary component of a
criminal justice system in order to avoid the equally undesirable
alternatives of excessively harsh penalties disproportionate to
culpability on the one hand, or nullification and excessive leni-
ency on the other. Youthfulness provides a rationale to mitigate
criminal responsibility. In theory, common law mens rea provides no special doctrinal
protections for youths older than 14 absent some "diminished responsibility" doctrine
which ameliorates punishment on the grounds of reduced culpability.
See e.g., Podkopacz & Feld, Judicial Waiver Policy, supra note 18; Podkopacz &
Feld, End of the Line, supra note 18.
" FRANKLIN zRING, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE 89-96 (1982);
REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON SENTENCING POLICY TOWARD
YOUNG OFFENDERS, CONFRONTING YOUTH CRIME 66-69 (1978) [hereinafter
CONFRONTINGYoUTH CRIME].
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sentences to some degree without excusing criminal conduct.
But, shorter sentences for young people do not require a sepa-
rate justice system in which to try them. Both juvenile and adult
courts separate adjudication of guilt or innocence from sentenc-
ing, confine consideration of individual circumstances largely to
the latter phase, and criminal courts may impose lenient sen-
tences on young offenders when appropriate.
A variety of doctrinal and policy reasons justify sentencing
young people less severely than their adult counterparts. The
common law's infancy mens rea defense antedated positive
criminology's deterministic assumptions, and recognized that
young people may lack criminal capacity. The classical criminal
law assumed that rational actors make blameworthy choices and
deserve to suffer the consequences of their freely chosen acts.0
The common law recognized and exempted from punishment
categories of persons who lacked the requisite moral and crimi-
nal responsibility, for example, the insane and the young.61 It
conclusively presumed that children less than seven-years-old
lacked criminal capacity, and treated those fourteen-years-of-age
and older as fully responsible.62 Between the ages of seven and
fourteen years, the law rebuttably presumed criminal incapac-
ity.63 The common law infancy gradations reflect developmental
differences that render youths less culpable or criminally respon-
sible than their adult counterparts and provide a first approxi-
mation of a rationale for shorter sentences for youths than for
adults. Juvenile court legislation simply extended upward by a
few years the general presumption of youthful criminal irre-
sponsibility and incapacity.
The extent to which young offenders, like adults, deserve
punishment hinges on the meaning of culpability. Respect for
the integrity of the individual provides the underlying rationale
of deserved punishment. Just deserts theory treats a free-will actor
as an "end," a sovereign person, rather than as a "means" to be
60 SeeANDREW VON HIRSCH, DoINGJusTICE (1976); Kadish, supra note 55.
6! Goldstein & Katz, supra note 56.
62 See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
61 James C. Weissman, Toward an Integrated Theory of Delinquency Responsibility, 60
DENY. L.J. 485, 490 (1983); Francis Barry McCarthy, The Role of the Concept of Responsi-
bility in Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings, 10 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 181, 184-85 (1977);
Walkover, supra note 29, at 514; SanfordJ. Fox, Responsibility in the Juvenile Court, 11
WM. & MARYL. REv. 659, 660 (1970).
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manipulated by the state to achieve some ulterior utilitarian so-
cial objective, including her own well-being.r Blaming a culpa-
ble actor for her voluntary choice to do wrong and giving her
the consequences that her choice deserves respects her integrity
as a morally responsible individual. Deserved punishment em-
phasizes censure and condemnation for blameworthy choices.6
As long as the criminal law rests on a moral foundation, the idea
of blameworthiness remains central to ascribing guilt and allo-
cating punishment.6 Penalties proportionate to the seriousness
of the crime reflect the connection between conduct, choice,
and blameworthiness.
Because commensurate punishment proportions sanctions
to the seriousness of the offense, it shifts the analytical focus to
the meaning of seriousness. Two elements-harm and culpabil-
ity-define the seriousness of an offense. Evaluations of harm
focus on the nature and degree of injury inflicted, risk created,
or value taken. A perpetrator's age has little bearing on assess-
ments of harmfulness. But evaluations of seriousness also in-
clude the quality of the actor's choice to engage in the criminal
conduct that produced the harm. Just deserts theory and
criminal law grading principles base the degree of deserved
punishment on an actor's culpability. For example, a person
may cause the death of another individual with premeditation
and deliberation, intentionally, "in the heat of passion," reck-
lessly, negligently, or accidentally.r8 The criminal law treats the
same objective consequence or harm, the death of another per-
' H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 210-37 (1968); VON HIRSCH, supra
note 60, at 49-55.
6' "[P]unishing someone conveys in dramatic fashion that his conduct was wrong
and that he is blameworthy for having committed it." VON HIRSCH, supra note 60, at
48. See also ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCMIONS (1993); ANDREWVON HIRSC-,
PASTORFUTURE CRIMES (1985).
NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IM ISONMENT 73-80 (1974); Stephen J. Morse,
Excusing the Crazy: The Insanity Defense Reconsidered, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 779, 793 (1985).
67 Ernest van den Haag contends that:
There is little reason left for not holding juveniles responsible under the same
laws that apply to adults. The victim of a fifteen-year-old muggers [sic] is as
much mugged as the victim of a twenty-year-old mugger, the victim of a fourteen-
year-old murderer or rapist is just as dead or as raped as the victim of an older
one. The need for socialdefense or protection is the same.
ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS: CONCERNING A VERY OLD AND PAINFUL
QUESTION 174 (1975).
6'JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF COMMON LAW 105-45 (1960).
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son, very differently depending upon the nature of the choice
made.
Youthfulness acquires special salience when gauging the
culpability of choices-the blameworthiness of acting in a par-
ticular harm-producing way. In a framework of deserved pun-
ishment, it would be fundamentally unjust to impose the same
penalty upon offenders who do not share equal culpability. If
young people are neither fully responsible nor the moral equals
of adults, then they do not deserve the same legal consequences
even for their blameworthy misconduct.
Responsibility for choices hinges on cognitive and volitional
competence. Do young offenders make criminal choices that
constitute the moral equivalents of those made by more mature
actors? If one focuses narrowly only on the capacity to make in-
strumental choices to do wrong, then we could view even very
young actors as criminally responsible. For example, a six-year-
old child can act purposively to "steal" the toy of a friend even
though she "knows" and can articulate that such conduct is
"wrong." When young children make voluntary and instrumen-
tal choices to engage in prohibited conduct, they possess some
moral ability to understand its wrongfulness and require disci-
pline to hold them accountable and to teach them the conse-
quences of violating rules. However, despite their ability to
make reasoned choices and engage in goal-oriented behavior,
we do not regard them as full moral agents. The criminal law
regards young actors differently exactly because they have not
yet fully internalized moral norms, developed sufficient em-
pathic identification with others, acquired adequate moral
comprehension, or had sufficient opportunity to develop the
ability to restrain their actions. They possess neither the ration-
ality-cognitive capacity-nor the self-control-volitional capac-
ity-to equate their criminal responsibility with that of adults.
1. Developmental Psychology
Developmental psychology posits that young people move
through a sequence of psychological stages and their opera-
tional processes, legal reasoning, internalization of social and
legal expectations, and ethical decision making change as they
[Vol. 88
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pass through these stages.6 Children's moral reasoning at dif-
ferent developmental stages differs from that which they use at
other stages, and differs qualitatively from that which adults use.
The descriptions of the developmental sequence and changes in
cognitive processes parallel strikingly the imputations of respon-
sibility associated with the common law infancy defense,70 and
suggest that by mid-adolescence youths acquire most of the
cognitive and moral reasoning capacity that will guide their be-
havior through later life.7 ' Somewhere between about eleven
and fourteen-years-of-age, children achieve the highest stage of
cognitive development, the "formal operational" stage, in which
they can think abstractly and hypothetically, weigh and compare
consequences, and consider alternative solutions to problems.72
Developmental psychological research on adolescents' cog-
nitive decision-making ability suggests that "for most purposes,
adolescents cannot be distinguished from adults on the grounds
of competence .... 7"s When youths solve problems or make in-
formed consent decisions for psychotherapy or medical treat-
ment, social psychologists find few bases on which to distinguish
the quality of judgments made by adolescents fifteen-years-of-
age or older from those made by adults in terms of eithei the
reasoning processes, the information used, or qualitative out-
6' See JEAN PIAGET, THE MORALJuDGMENT OF THE CHILD 26-28 (1965); June L. Tapp
& Lawrence Kohlberg, Developing Senses of Law and Legal Justice, in LAW, JUSTICE, AND
THE INDIvIDuALIN SoCmXy 89, 90 (June L. Tapp & Felice Levine eds., 1974); Lawrence
Kohlberg, Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Socialization, in
HANDBOOK OF SOCIALIZATION THEORY AND RESEARCH 325, 347 (David Goslin ed.,
1969); Lawrence Kohlberg, Development of Moral Character and Moral Ideology, in REVIEW
OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH 383, 386 (M. Hoffman ed., 1964); June L. Tapp &
Felice Levine, Legal Socialization: Strategies for an Ethical Legality, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1
(1974); Lawrence Kohlberg, The Development of Children's Orientations Toward a Moral
Order, 6 VrrA HUMANA 11 (1963) [hereinafter Kohlberg, Orientations Toward a Moral
Order].
70 See supra authorities cited in note 63.
7' PIAGET, supra note 69, at 314-25; Kohlberg, Orientations Toward a Moral Order, su-
pra note 69, at 11; June L. Tapp, Psychology and the Law: An Overture, 27 ANN. REV.
PSYCHOL. 359, 374 (1976).
7 ROBERT S. SIEGLER, CHILDREN'S THINKING 41-42 (1986). Justice Douglas' dissent
in Wisconsin v. Yoder, which exempted Amish children from compulsory school atten-
dance laws at age 14, cited the work of Piaget and Kohlberg for the proposition that
"there is substantial agreement among child psychologists and sociologists that the
moral and intellectual maturity of the 14 year-old approaches that of the adult." 406
U.S. 205, 245 n.3 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
nGary B. Melton, Toward "Personhood"for Adolescents: Autonomy and Privacy as Values
in Public Policy, 38 AM. PSYCHOL. 99, 100 (1983).
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comes.7 ' Research on young peoples' ability to make informed
consent medical decisions generally supports the equation be-
tween adolescents' and adults' cognitive abilities. 75 A review of
several psychological studies of adolescents' reasoning processes
and understanding and use of medical information about their
conditions and treatment options found that adolescents and
adults generally made qualitatively comparable decisions. 76
The empirical support for adolescents' cognitive equality
with adults derives primarily from research on informed medi-
cal consent that emphasizes subjective preferences rather than
qualitative outcomes. Because informed consent policies pro-
mote patients' autonomy to make medical decisions, cognitive
psychological research focuses narrowly on youths' ability to
understand and appreciate information about risks and alterna-
tives, and to use that information in a rational process. Moreo-
ver, most of these decision-making studies occured in a
laboratory setting in which researchers posed hypothetical
treatment scenarios and provided respondents with complete
information. It remains unproven, however, whether the ability
to make hypothetical medical decisions under structured condi-
tions constitutes adult-equivalent competence, judgment, and
responsibility in other contexts which focus on objective out-
comes rather than subjective preferences or in real-life situa-
tions with actual consequences. 77 For purposes of formulating a
71 Id. at 100-01; Gary B. Melton, Children's Competence to Consent: A Problem in Law
and Social Science in CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE TO CONSENT 15 (Gary B. Melton et al.
eds., 1983).
7' See Lois A. Weithorn & Susan B. Campbell, The Competency of Children and Adoles-
cents to Make Informed Treatment Decisions, 53 CHILD DEv. 1589, 1595 (1982) (fourteen-
year-olds' choices did not differ significantly from those of adults in terms of compre-
hension, understanding of alternatives, rational reasoning, and decision making pro-
cesses when responding to medical and psychological treatment hypotheticals);
Thomas Grisso & Linda Vierling, Minors' Consent to Treatment: A Developmental Perspec-
tive, 9 PROF. PSYCHOL. 412, 423 (1978) (little research evidence exists that adolescents
aged 15 or older possess less competence than adults to provide knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary informed consent).
76 See Elizabeth S. Scott, Judgment and Reasoning in Adolescent Decisionmaking, 37 VILL.
L. REV. 1607, 1627-30 (1992).
77 Id. at 1626; Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, Maturity of Judgment in
Adolescence: Psychosocial Factors in Adolescent Decision Making, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
249, 250 (1996) [hereinafter Steinberg & Cauffman, Maturity of Judgment] ("the in-
formed consent model is too narrow in scope to adequately illuminate differences be-
tween adolescents' and adults' decision-making, because it overemphasizes cognitive
functioning (e.g., capacity for thinking, reasoning, understanding) and minimizes the
importance of noncognitive, psychosocial, variables that influence the decision-
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youth sentencing policy, the claims of some developmental psy-
chologists that adolescents' cognitive competency approximates
that of adults proves too much. "Get tough" proponents then
could argue that they should be punished for crimes just like
adults.
Many developmental psychologists question the appropri-
ateness of advocating for presumptive legal equality based on
adolescents' cognitive parity with adults to' make informed
medical decisions.7 8 Cognitive capacity alone does not comprise
the only relevant dimension on which policymakers can distin-
guish between young people and adults. More recent research
indicates that child development occurs more continuously and
gradually, rather than as an all-or-nothing invariant stage and
sequence, and that young people use different reasoning proc-
esses simultaneously in different task domains.9 Youths' devel-
opmental skills and knowledge may accrue unevenly in different
task areas rather than as a uniform increase in overall capacity.
Moreover, differences in language ability, knowledge, experi-
ence, and culture affect the ages at which different individuals'
various competencies emerge. s A comprehensive analytical re-
view of developmental psychological research concludes that
while those findings undermine support for the treatment of
adolescents as incompetent and categorically different from
adults, they do not support the converse proposition that young
people and adults therefore function equally and that no legally
significant differences exist between them."'
making process"). See also Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, The Cognitive
and Affective Influence on Adolescent Decision-Making, 68 TEmI,. L. REv. 1763 (1995)
[hereinafter Cauffman & Steinberg, Adolescent Decision-Making].
See William Gardner et al., Asserting Scientific Authority: Cognitive Development and
Adolescent Legal Rights, 44 AM. PSyCHOL. 895, 897-98 (1989); Scott, supra note 76, at
1631; Elizabeth Scott et al., Evaluating Adolescent Decision Making in Legal Contexts, 19
LAW & HUM. BluAv. 221, 224 (1995).
' See SiEGLER, supra note 72, at 344-81; Gardner et al., supra note 78, at 898; Scott,
supra note 76, at 1632.
go Thomas Grisso, Society's Retributive Response to Juvenile Violence: A Developmental Per-
spective 20 LAw & HUM. BEsAV. 229, 233 (1996) ("Progress toward completion of cog-
nitive and moral developmental stages can be detoured or delayed by cultural,
intellectual, and social disadvantages.").
8 Scott, supra note 76, at 1633. Current research "certainly casts doubt on the pre-
sumption that adolescent reasoning and understanding are inferior. Our current
state of knowledge is far too inconclusive, however, to support a positive claim that no
differences distinguish adolescent and adult decisionmaking, and that the research
findings themselves dictate a direction for legal policy." Id. at 1635-36.
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Even a youth fourteen-years-of-age or older who abstractly
knows "right from wrong," who understands intentionality, and
who possesses the requisite criminal mens rea for a finding of
guilt still deserves neither the blame nor the comparable pun-
ishment of an adult offender. Juveniles possess less ability than
adults to make sound judgments or moral distinctions, or to act
with the same culpability as adults. Because youths possess less
ability than adults to control their impulses or to appreciate the
consequences of their acts, they deserve less punishment even
when they commit the same criminal harm. 2
Certain characteristic developmental differences distinguish
the quality ofjudgments that young people make from those of
adults and justify a somewhat more protective stance toward
younger decision-makers. 3 Attributions of responsibility involve
volitional controls-the ability to exercise self-control-as well
as cognitive capacity-knowledge of right from wrong. Con-
cepts like psychosocial "maturity" or "temperance" provide bases
for assessing the qualities of judgment or the decision-making
competencies of adolescents compared with adults. 4 Mature
judgments result from the interaction of cognitive and psycho-
social factors and deficiencies in either domain may undermine
competent decisions. Crucially, for purposes of comparing the
qualities of judgment and self-control, adolescents and adults
may differ in their breadth of experience, short-term versus
long-term temporal perspective, attitude toward risk, impulsiv-
ity, and the importance they attach to peer influence."' Three
developmentally unique attributes of youth-temporal perspec-
tive, attitudes toward and acceptance of risk, and susceptibility
" CHARLES SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 355 (1978);
CONFRONTING YOUTH CRIME, supra note 59, at 7 (adolescents are more vulnerable and
more impulsive, and have less self-discipline or capacity to control their conduct than
adults).
" Scott, supra note 76, at 1610; Steinberg & Cauffman, Maturity inJudgment, supra
note 77, at 251. "[T]he intuition behind paternalistic policies is that developmentally
linked traits and responses systematically affect the decisionmaking of adolescents in
a way that may incline them to make choices that threaten harm to their own and
others' health, life, or welfare, to a greater extent than do adults." Scott et al., supra
note 78, at 227.
" Steinberg & Cauffman, Maturity in Judgment, supra note 77, at 252; Cauffman &
Steinberg, Adolescent Decision-Making, supra note 77, at 1765; Scott et al., supra note 78,
at 227.
's Scott, supra note 76, at 1610; Steinberg & Cauffman, Maturity in Judgmen, supra
note 77, at 258-62.
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to peer influences-may affect young peoples' qualities of
judgment in ways that distinguish them from adults and bear on
their criminal responsibility.
A developmentally informed youth sentencing policy would
emphasize qualities of "judgment" rather than narrow cognitive
capacity, ask whether young people characteristically make
poorer quality choices than they would when they are somewhat
older (because of adolescent-specific emotional, psychosocial,
or developmental differences) and reflect young people's lesser
developmental capacities. If adolescents likely will make better,
adult-quality decisions with maturity, "then the case for protect-
ing the opportunities and prospects of that future adult from
the costs of her immature youthful judgment and choices seems
powerful."
8
2. Risk-Taking
Risk entails a chance of loss; risk-taking behavior entails
conduct that exposes the actor to-those potential adverse con-
sequences. Young people are more impulsive, exercise less
self-control, fail adequately to calculate long-term consequences
and engage in more risky behavior than do adults. Adolescents
may estimate the magnitude or probability of risks, may use a
shorter time-frame, or focus on opportunities for gains rather
than possibilities of losses differently than adults.8 The greater
prevalence of accidents, suicides and homicides as the primary
causes of death of the young reflect greater "risk-taking" behav-
ior.89 Teenager's greater proclivity to engage in unprotected
sex, to speed and drive recklessly, and to engage in criminal be-
havior reflect their taking risks with respect to health and
safety.Y
Criminal behavior constitutes a specific form of highly risky
behavior, and every theory of crime attempts to account for the
Scott et al., supra note 78, at 228.
87 Lita Furby & Ruth Beyth-Marom, Risk Taking in Adolescence: A Decision-Making Per-
spectiv4 12 DEwLOPMENTAL REV. 1, 3 (1992).
831!&
89 William Gardner, A Life-Span Rational Choice Theory of Risk Taking, in ADOLESCENT
PRsKTABING 66, 67 (NancyJ. Bell & Robert W. Bell eds., 1993).
'0 Scott et al., supra note 78, at 230.
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age-specific nature of offending.9' The differences between ado-
lescent and adult decision-making with regard to risk are rele-
vant in assessing criminal responsibility for the quality of their
choices. 92 A decision-making calculus requires the actor to iden-
tify possible outcomes, identify possible consequences that may
follow from each option, evaluate the positive or negative desir-
ability of those consequences, estimate the likelihood of those
various consequences occurring, and develop a decisional rule
to optimize outcomes. 93 Experimental and developmental psy-
chological literatures suggest that adolescents may approach
these various decision-making steps differently from adults.
Youths may engage in riskier behavior than adults because they
differ both in the extent of knowledge they possess and the
amount of information they actually use when they make deci-
sions. Unlike informed consent cognitive tests conducted un-
der laboratory conditions with all relevant information, in less-
structured, real-life circumstances, adolescents may simply pos-
sess or use less information about risks than adults.
Even when adolescents possess and use comparable infor-
mation, they may assign different subjective values to the alter-
native consequences. Youths' developmentally influenced cost-
benefit calculus may cause them to weigh benefits and conse-
quences differently and to discount negative future conse-
quences in ways that may systematically skew the quality of their
choices. In some instances, youths simply may perceive risky
behavior as posing lower probabilities of eventuating than do
adults.94 In others cases, youths' subjective valuations of risks
and consequences may cause them to make different choices
than do adults.95 Adolescents may weigh the negative conse-
91 See, e.g., MICHAEL P- GOTTFEDSON & TRAvIs HIRSCHI, A GENERAL THEORY OF CRIME
124-44 (1990).
92 An extensive review of the empirical literature on risk-taking and cognitive de-
velopment reports "mixed results regarding the degree to which adolescents may be
taking more risks than other age level[s]," and cautions that "we know very little
about either overall decision-making competence among adolescence or the devel-
opment of specific skills that are necessary for or that facilitate effective decision-
making." Furby & Beyth-Marom, supra note 87, at 38. See also Grisso, supra note 80, at
232-35.
"See also Grisso, supra note 80, at 232-35.
' Furby and Beyth-Marom speculate that "adolescents [may] judge some negative
consequences in the distant future to be of lower probability than do adults or to be
of less importance than adults do." Furby & Beyth-Marom, supra note 87, at 19.
95 Id.
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quences of not engaging in risky behaviors differently than
adults. For example, saying "no" to drugs may not mean the
same thing to a teen-ager seeking peer acceptance and good
feelings as it does to an adult with greater appreciation of the
risks of drugs and more to lose from involvement in the justice
system. Similarly, an adolescent's decision to participate with
friends in a robbery may reflect a different risk-calculus than an
adult's in terms of a greater emphasis on short-term benefits
versus long-term negative legal consequences.96 Youths' impulsi-
tivity, unrealistic optimism, or feelings of "invulnerability" and
"immortality" also may contribute to risk-taking behavior.
Rational choice theory also helps to account for adoles-
cents' greater propensity for risk-taking.98 People make utility-
maximizing choices within a context of constraints, and people
at different stages of their lives will make different valuations of
uncertain future events. Knowledge about one's self, social en-
vironment, and life-course trajectory increase with age and af-
fect a person's short-term versus long-term calculus. Because
young people have much less clarity about their futures than do
adults, "a focus on the immediate rather than the long-term
consequences of a decision is a rational response to uncertainty
about the future."99 As a result, young people may discount the
negative value of future consequences because they have more
difficulty than adults in integrating a future consequence into
their more limited experiential baseline. Thus, adolescents may
discount the cost of longer-term future consequences and weigh
shorter-term benefits more heavily than adults.100
Another developmental perspective for assessing adolescent
risk-taking emphasizes temperance or the ability to limit impulsiv-
ity and evaluate a situation thoroughly.'O Developmental psy-
9Scott et al., supra note 78, at 234.
"Lawrence D. Cohn et al., Risk-Perception: Differences Between Adolescents and Adults,
14 HEALTH PSYCHOL 217, 221 (1995) (adolescents engage in health-threatening ac-
tivities because they do not regard such behavior as extremely risk or unsafe, rather
than because of unique feelings of invulnerability); Furby & Beyth-Marom, supra note
87, at 19-21.
"Gardner, supra note 89, at 70.
9 Id. at 77.
100 William Gardner & Janna Herman, Adolescents' AIDS Risk Taking: A Rational
Choice Perspective, in ADOLESCENTS AND THE AIDS EPIDEMIC 18-19 (W. Gardner et al.
eds., 1991).
11 Steinberg & Cauffrnan, Maturity inJudgment, supra note 77, at 258-62.
1997]
BARRY C. FELD
chological studies examine ways in which adolescents' judg-
ments may differ from adults because of their disposition to-
ward sensation-seeking, impulsivity related to hormonal or
physiological changes and mood volatility.10 2  For example,
hormonal and physiological changes, mood volatility, and pre-
disposition toward sensation-seeking affect the quality of deci-
sion-making and maturity ofjudgements, and cause adolescents
to experience more difficulty controlling their impulses than
adults. 0 3 Because adolescents' predisposition to risk-taking re-
flects generic developmental processes rather than malevolent
personal choices, it provides one sentencing policy rationale to
protect the adult that the youth eventually will become from the
detrimental consequences of immature decisions.
3. Peer Group Influences
Adolescents respond to peer group influences more readily
than adults because of the crucial role peer relationships play in
identity formation.04 Youth's greater desire for acceptance and
approval renders them more susceptible to peer influences as
they adjust their behavior and attitudes to conform to those of
their contemporaries. °5 Significantly, young people "commit
crimes, as they live their lives, in groups."1 8 Police arrest a
larger proportion of two or more juveniles for involvement in a
single criminal event than they do adults.0 7 Young peoples' de-
velopmentally greater susceptibility to peer group influences
and group process dynamics than their older counterparts less-
ens, but does not excuse, their criminal responsibility. It takes
time, experience, and opportunities for young people to de-
velop the capacity for autonomous judgments and resistance to
the influences of peers. Because the group-nature of youth
crime renders all equally as a criminally liable, it poses a chal-
o See generally Steinberg & Cauffman, Maturity in Judgment, supra note 77; Cauff-
man & Steinberg, Adolescent Decision-Making, supra note 77.
" Steinberg & Cauffman, Maturity inJudgment, supra note 77; Cauffman & Stein-
berg, Adolescent Decision-Making, supra note 77, at 1780.
0' See ERIK ERIMSON, IDENTITY. YOUTH AND CRISIS (1968); Steinberg & Cauffman,
Maturity in Judgment, supra note 77, at 254-56.
" Scott et al., supra note 78, at 230. See also infra notes 144-47 and accompanying
text.10 Franklin E. Zimring, Kids, Groups and Crime: Some Implications of a Well-Known Se-
cret, 72J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 867, 867 (1981).
'07 id See also SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 2, at 47.
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lenge to formulate a youth sentencing policy that recognizes dif-
ferential participation and culpability of different adolescent
members of a group.
4. Reduced Culpability
In Thompson v. Oklahoma,"8 the Supreme Court analyzed
the criminal responsibility of young offenders and provided ad-
ditional support for shorter sentences for reduced culpability
even for youths older than the common law infancy threshold of
age fourteen. Thompson presented the issue whether executing
an offender for a heinous murder conmitted when he was fif-
teen-years-old violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition on
"cruel and unusual punishments." In vacating Thompson's
capital sentence, the plurality concluded that "a young person is
not capable of acting with the degree of culpability that can jus-
tify the ultimate penalty."1°9
Although the Court provided several rationales for its deci-
sion, it explicitly concluded that juveniles are less culpable for
their crimes than are their adult counterparts.1 Significantly,
even though the Court found Thompson responsible for his
crime, it concluded that he could not be punished as severely as
an adult, simply because of his age.11'
The Thompson Court emphasized that even though youths
may inflict blameworthy harms, the culpability of their choice is
"3 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
'0 Id. at 822-23.
" Id at 833-34. The Thompson Court emphasized that deserved punishment must
reflect individual culpability and concluded that "it]here is also broad agreement on
the proposition that adolescents as a class are less mature and responsible than
adults." Id at 834. Earlier juvenile death penalty decisions also emphasized the
youthfulness of an offender as a mitigating factor at sentencing. In Eddings v. Okla-
homa, the Court noted that "just as the chronological age of a minor is itself a relevant
mitigating factor of great weight, so must the background and mental and emotional
development of a youthful defendant be duly considered in sentencing." 455 U.S.
104, 116 (1982).
. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 834. The Court stated:
[Y] outh is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and condition of life when
aperson may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological damage. Our
history is replete with laws and judicial recognition that minors, especially in
their earler years,generally are less mature and responsible than adults. Partcu-
larly "during the formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors oftenlack the experience, perspective, and judgement expected of adults.... The
Court has a ready enorsed the proposition that less culpabiliy should attach to a
cnme committed by ajuvenile than to a comparable crime committed b, an adul
Id- at 834-35 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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less than that of adults." The Court cited numerous other ar-
eas of life (e.g., serving on a jury, voting, marrying, driving, and
drinking), as instances in which the legal system treated adoles-
cents differently from adults because of juveniles' lack of expe-
rience and judgment.' 3 In all of those cases, the Court noted,
the state acts paternalistically and imposes legal disabilities be-
cause of youths' presumptive incapacity to "exercise choice
freely and rationally.""14 The Court emphasized that it would be
both inconsistent and ironic suddenly to find juveniles the
equals of adult for purposes of capital punishment."'
Subsequently, in Stanford v. Kentucky, a different plurality of
the Supreme Court upheld the death penalty for youths who
were sixteen or seventeen at the time of their offenses, although
a majority of all states bar the practice. 6 While recognizing that
juveniles as a class possess less culpability than adults, the Court
decided Stanford on the narrow grounds that no clear national
consensus exists that such executions violated "evolving stan-
dards of decency" in the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
against "cruel and unusual" punishment.
7
5. Subjective Time
Quite apart from differences in culpability, because of dif-
ferences in their "time perspective," juveniles deserve less severe
punishment than do adults for comparable criminal harms. Al-
though we measure penalties in units of time--days, months, or
years-youths and adults subjectively and objectively conceive of
,' Id. at 835. The Court noted:
Inexperience, less education, and less intelligence make the teenager less able to
evaluate the consequences of his or her conduct while at the same time he or she
is much more apt to be motivated by mere emotion or peer pressure than is an
adult. The reasons why juveniles are not trusted with the privileges and respon-
sibilities of an adult also explain why their irresponsible conduct is not as morally
reprehensible as that of an adult.
Id.
113 d
n. Id. at 823-25.
"'Id. The Court noted that "the very assumptions we make about our children
when we legislate on their behalf tells us that it is likely cruel, and certainly unusual,
to impose on a child a punishment that takes as its predicate the existence of a fully
rational, choosing agent." Id.
n' 492 U.S. 361, 371 (1989).
17 Id. at 380.
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and experience similar lengths of time differently.'18 The devel-
opmental progression in thinking about and experiencing
time-future time perspective and present duration-follows a
developmental sequence that affects the evolution of judgment
and criminal responsibility. The ability to project events and
consequences into the future evolves gradually during adoles-
cence into early adulthood." 9 Without a mature appreciation of
future time, juveniles less fully understand or appreciate the
consequences of their acts, may give excess weight to immediate
goals, and, as a result, engage in riskier behavior. Because
youths do not perceive present time duration equivalently with
adults, a policy of "adult crime, adult time," which imposes
equal sentences on adults and juveniles, would be dispropor-
tionately more severe for the latter. Because of developmental
differences, time seems to pass more slowly when we are
younger. Consequently, youths experience objectively equal
punishment subjectively as more severe. While a three-month
sentence may seem lenient for an adult offender, for a child it
represents the equivalent of an entire summer vacation-a long
period of time. Because young people depend upon their fami-
lies, sentences of home removal or confinement are more de-
velopmentally disruptive than they would be for more formed
and independent adults.120
6. Toward a Youth Sentencing Policy Rationale
Certain characteristic developmental differences between
adolescents and adults distinguish their quality of judgment,
psychosocial maturity, and self-control, and justify a different
criminal sentencing policy for younger offenders. Youths differ
from adults on several dimensions that directly affect their de-
gree of criminal responsibility and deserved punishment:
breadth of experience; short-term versus long-term temporal
perspective; attitude toward and acceptance of risk; and suscep-
118 See W. FRIEDMAN, THE DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME (1982); THOMAS
COTTLE, PERCEIVING TIME: A PSYCHOLOGICAL INVESTIGATION WITH MEN AND WOMEN
(1976); JEAN PIAGET, THE CHILD'S CONCEPTION OF TIME (1969).
Steinberg & Cauffman, Maturity injudgmen4 supra note 77, at 266; Scott et al.,
supra note 78, at 231.
'2 ROBERT SAMPSON & JOHN LAUB, CRIME IN THE MAIaNG: PATHWAYS AND TURNING
POINTS THROUGH LIFE 95-98 (1993) (noting that positive ties to the family, the school,
and the workplace alter criminal career and life-course trajectories).
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tibility to peer influences. These developmentally unique at-
tributes affect young peoples' capacity to comprehend fully the
consequences of their actions and their empathic identification
with others. Moreover, it takes time and experience to develop
the capacity to exercise self-control. While young offenders pos-
sess sufficient understanding and culpability to hold them ac-
countable for their acts, their choices are less blameworthy than
those of adults because of truncated self-control. Their crimes
are less blameworthy not simply because of reduced culpability
and limited appreciation of consequences but because their life-
situations have understandably limited their capacity to learn to
make fully responsible choices.
When youths offend, the families, schools, and communities
that socialize them bear some responsibility for the failures of
socializing institutions.121 Human beings depend upon others
for nurture; this includes the ability to develop and exercise the
moral capacity for constructive behavior. The capacity for self-
control and self-direction is not a matter of moral luck or good
fortune, but a socially constructed developmental process that
provides young people with the opportunity to develop a moral
character. Zimring describes the "semi-autonomy" of adoles-
cence as a "learner's permit" that gives youths the opportunity
to make choices and to learn to be responsible but without suf-
fering fully the long-term consequences of their mistakes.
2
The ability to make responsible choices is learned behavior, and
the dependent status of youth systematically deprives them of
chances to learn to be responsible. Inevitably, when we grant
young people autonomy in order to learn to make mature
judgments, they will abuse that trust. Young peoples' socially
constructed life situation understandably limits their capacity to
develop self-control, restricts their opportunities to learn and
exercise responsibility, and supports a partial reduction of
criminal responsibility. Adolescence itself limits opportunities
fully to develop and internalize responsible adult-quality deci-
"1' The Twentieth Century Fund, in CONFRONTING YoUTH CRINM, noted that "youth
crime as such is not exclusively the offender's fault; offenses by the young also repre-
sent a failure of family, school, and the social system which share responsibility for the
development of youth." CONFRONTiNGYoumH CRIME, supra note 59, at 7.
in ZIMRING, supra note 59, at 90-99 (stating that youth sentencing policy minimizes
the harm young persons do themselves, reduces to a minimum the harm sanctions
inflict on them when they harm the community, and "preserves the life chances for those
who make serious mistakes") (emphasis added).
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sion-making. Their susceptibility to peer group influences re-
flects truncated development of their own capacity for autono-
mous and independent judgment. Thus, a youth sentencing
policy must recognize youths' reduced opportunities and abili-
ties to make responsible choices. Such a policy would entail
both shorter sentence durations and a higher offense-
seriousness threshold before a state incarcerates youths than for
older offenders.
B. ADMINISTERING YOUTHFULNESS AS A MITIGATING FACTOR AT
SENTENCING: THE "YOUTH DISCOUNT"
Implementing a youth sentencing policy entails legal,
moral, and social judgments. Because of developmental differ-
ences and the social construction of adolescence, younger of-
fenders are less criminally responsible than more mature
violators. But, they are not so essentially different and inher-
ently incompetent as the current legal dichotomy between juve-
nile and criminal court suggests. The binary distinction
between infant and adult that provides the bases for states' legal
age of majority and the jurisprudential foundation of the juve-
nile court ignores the reality that adolescents develop along a
continuum and creates an unfortunate either-or choice in sen-
tencing. In view of the developmental psychological research
that suggests several ways in which youths systematically differ
from adults, should the criminal law adopt a "youth-blind"
stance and treat fourteen-year-olds as the moral equivalent of
adults for purposes of sentencing, or should it devise a youth
sentencing policy that reflects more appropriately the develop-
mental continuum?
Shorter sentences for reduced responsibility represents a
more modest and attainable reason to treat young offenders dif-
ferently than adults than the rehabilitative justifications ad-
vanced by Progressive childsavers. In this context, adolescent
criminal responsibility represents a global judgement about the
degree of youths' deserved punishment, rather than a technical
legal judgment about whether or not a particular youth pos-
sessed the requisite mene rea or mental state defined in the
criminal statute. If adolescents as a class characteristically exer-
cise poorer judgment than do adults, then sentencing policies
1997]
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can reduce the long-term harm that they cause to themselves.s
Protecting young people from the full penal consequences of
their poor decisions reflects a policy to preserve their life
chances for the future when they presumably will make more
mature and responsible choices. Such a policy simultaneously
holds young offenders accountable for their acts because they
possess sufficient culpability, and yet mitigates the severity of
consequences because their choices entail less blameworthiness
than those of adults.
Criminal courts in some jurisdictions already consider
"youthfulness" in the context of aggravating and mitigating fac-
tors, and may impose shorter sentences on a discretionary ba-
sis.12 4  Although the federal sentencing guidelines explicitly
reject "youthfulness" as a justification to sentence outside of the
guidelines range,125 sentencing statutes in some states recognize
"youthfulness" as a mitigating factor at sentencing.2 Under
these aggravating-mitigating sentencing laws, trial court judges
regularly consider youthfulness both de jure and de facto; appel-
late courts may remand them for resentencing if they do not.
12
123 Scott, supra note 76, at 1656 ("[I]f the values that drive risky choices are associ-
ated with youth, and predictably will change with maturity, then our paternalistic in-
clination is to protect the young decision-maker.., from his or her bad judgment.").
See also ZIMRING, supra note 59, at 90-99.
,2' Apart from capital punishment, the United States Supreme Court gives great
constitutional deference and virtually unreviewable authority to states to formulate
their sentencing policy. SeeHarmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1008 (1991) (stating
that a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for
possession of cocaine did not require any "individualized" consideration of any per-
sonal mitigating circumstances). Harmelin overruled the Court's earlier decision in
Solem v. Helms, 463 U.S. 277 (1983). The Court in Solem held that the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition on "cruel and unusual punishment" entitled a non-capital
defendant to proportionality analysis focusing on: severity of the penalty in relation to
the gravity of the offense; comparison with sentences imposed for other types of
crimes within the same jurisdiction; and comparison with the sentences imposed in
other states for the same type of crime. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 965.
,2sU.S. SENTENCING GUIDELNES MANUAL § 5H.1 (1995).
,2' See, e.g., AIZ. REv. STAT. § 13-702(D) (1) (1996); FLA. STAT. ch. 921.0016(4)(k)
(1996) ("the defendant was too young to appreciate the consequences of the of-
fense"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 905.5(f) (West 1997) ("the youth of the offender at the
time of the offense"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-134.D.16 (e)(4) (1996) ("The defen-
dant's age, immaturity, or limited mental capacity").
1 See, e.g., State v. Adams, 864 S.W.2d 31, 33 (Tenn. 1993) ("[C]ourts should con-
sider the concept of youth in context, i.e., the defendant's age, education, maturity,
experience, mental capacity or development, and any other pertinent circumstance
tending to demonstrate the defendant's ability or inability to appreciate the nature of
his conduct."); State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297, 1300-02 (Utah 1993) (noting that trial
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However, states that consider youthfulness as a mitigating factor
simply treat it as one element to be weighed with other aggravat-
ing and mitigating factors in deciding what sentence to impose
on an individual.
In most jurisdictions, however, whether a trial judge treats
"youthfulness" as a mitigating factor rests within her "sound dis-
cretion." Failure to exercise leniency does not constitute re-
versible error or an abuse of discretion, and courts impose
sentences of "life without parole" even on very young offend-
128
ers.
Uniquely among the states, the Nevada Supreme Court in
Naovarath v. State considered whether a mandatory term of "life
without parole" imposed on a fourteen-year-old convicted of
murder constituted "cruel and unusual punishment," and in-
cluded "youthfulness" as a consideration in its proportionality
analysis.'2 Because Nevada excluded young murderers from ju-
venile court jurisdiction without any minimum age restriction,3 0
the court asserted that there must be some young age at which a
criminal sentence of life without parole would constitute a
"cruel and unusual" punishment."' The court asserted that the
state's constitutional prohibition on "cruel and unusual pun-
ishments" required the judiciary to articulate "evolving stan-
court's failure to consider defendant's youthful age as a mitigating factor warranted
remand for resentencing).
'2 For example, in State v. Furman, the Washington Supreme Court ruled that the
state constitution prohibited the execution of youths for crimes committed under the
age of 18, but upheld its authority to imprison them for mandatory terms of life with-
out parole. 858 P.2d 1092, 1102 (Wash. 1993). In State v. Massey, the Washington
Court of Appeals upheld a sentence of life without parole for a 13-year-old juvenile
convicted as an adult and rejected any special consideration of the youth's age. 803
P.2d 340, 348 (Wash. Ct App. 1990). The court held that the test to measure "cruel
and unusual punishment" or proportionality "does not embody an element or con-
sideration of the defendant's age, only a balance between the crime and the sentence
imposed. Therefore, there is no cause to create a distinction between ajuvenile and
an adult who are (sic] sentenced to life without parole for first degree aggravated
murder." Id
'2 Naovarath v. State, 779 P.2d 944, 948-49 (Nev. 1989).
"s NEV. REV. STAT. § 62.040 (1979).
m Naovarath, 779 P.2d at 946. The court commented:
Most agree that it would be excessive to sentence a nine or ten year old to life
imprisonment without possibility of parole. Children of this age simply cannot
be said to deserve this kind of severe punishment, nor can it be said that a child
of such tender years is so unalterably bad that no parole release should ever be
considered.
Id-
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dards of decency.",12 The court concluded that even for the
most serious crimes, a sentence of life without parole consti-
tuted a disproportionately "cruel and unusual" penalty because
of "the undeniably lesser culpability of children for their bad ac-
tions, their capacity for growth and society's special obligation
to children.' ' 33 Although the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed
the state constitutional proportionality analyses and juveniles'
reduced culpability, it provides virtually no practical protections
or limitations on the legislature's power to prescribe severe
penalties for youths. By a 3-2 vote, the court held only that a
youth must receive a parole hearing at some time in the distant
future in order for a mandatory life sentence to pass state con-
stitutional muster.
A statutory sentencing policy that integrates youthfulness,
reduced culpability, and restricted opportunities to learn self
control with principles of proportionality would provide
younger offenders with categorical fractional reductions of
adult sentences. Because "youthfulness" constitutes a universal
form of "reduced responsibility," states should treat it unequivo-
cally as a mitigating factor without regard to nuances of individ-
ual developmental differences. Treating youthfulness as a
formal mitigating sentencing factor represents a social, moral,
and criminal policy judgment rather than a clinical or psychiat-
ric evaluation. Such an approach avoids the risks of discretion-
ary clinical subjectivity inherent in individualized adolescent
culpability determinations.
This categorical approach would take the form of an ex-
plicit "youth discount" at sentencing. A fourteen-year-old of-
fender might receive, for example, 25-33% of the adult penalty,
a sixteen-year-old defendant, 50-60%, and an eighteen-year-old
adult the full penalty, as presently occurs. The "deeper dis-
counts" for younger offenders correspond to the developmental
continuum and their more limited opportunities to learn and
.. Id& at 947. The court said:
What constitutes cruel and unusual punishment for a child presents an especially
difficult question .... If putting this child away until his death is not cruel, it is
certainly unusual. To adjudicate a thirteen-year-old to be forever irredeemable
and to subject a child of this age to hopeless, lifelong punishment and segrega-
tion is not a usual or acceptable response to childhood criminality, even when
the criminality amounts to murder.
Id.
1 Id. at 948.
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exercise responsibility. A youth discount based on reduced cul-
pability functions as a sliding scale of diminished responsibility.
Just as adolescents posses less criminally responsibility than do
adults, fourteen-year-old youths should enjoy a greater mitiga-
ion of blameworthiness than would seventeen-year-olds. Be-
cause the rationale for youthful mitigation rests upon reduced
culpability and limited opportunities to learn to make responsi-
ble choices, younger adolescents bear less responsibility and de-
serve proportionally shorter sentences than older youths. The
capacity to learn to be responsible improves with time and ex-
perience. With the passage of time, age, and opportunities to
develop the capacity for self-control, social tolerance of criminal
deviance and claims for mitigation decline. Several youth sen-
tencing policy groups and scholars implicitly endorse the con-
cept of a "youth discount" or a sliding scale of criminal
responsibility for younger offenders.T4
Discounted sentences that preserve younger offenders' life
chances require that the maximum sentences they receive re-
main substantially below those imposed on adults135 For youths
"4 AiMICAN BAR ASS'N, JUVENILE JUsTICE STANDARDS RELATING TO DISPOSITIONS 35
(1980), emphasized the relationship between age and sanctions: "The age of the ju-
venile is also relevant to the determination of the seriousness of his or her behavior.
In most cases, the older the juvenile, the greater is his or her responsibility for break-
ing the law." CONFRONTING Youh CRIME, supra note 59, at 6-7, also concluded that
the law should hold young offenders accountable by age 13 or 14, at least to some de-
gree because youths of that age "are aware of the severity of the criminal harms they
inflict and that, much as they fall short of maturity or self-control, they are morally
and should be legally responsible for intentionally destructive behavior. The older
the adolescent, the greater the degree of responsibility the law should presume."
The sentencing principles of frugality or parsimony of punishment, or the "least
restrictive alternative" also provide support for a "youth discount." See, e.g., MORRIS,
supra note 66, at 59-60; JUVENILEJUSTICE STANDARDS RELATING TO DISPOSITIONS, supra,
at 34 ("the court should employ the least restrictive category and duration of disposi-
tion that is appropriate to the seriousness of the offense, as modified by the degree of
culpability indicated by the circumstances of the particular case, and by the age and
prior record of the juvenile."); NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM., JUVENILE JUSTICE AND
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION 440 (1980) ("In choosing among statutorily permissible
dispositions, the court should employ the least coercive category and duration of dis-
position that are appropriate to the seriousness of the delinquent act, as modified by
the degree of culpability indicated by the circumstances of the particular case, age
and prior record.").
' AMERICAN BAR A S'N, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS RELATING TO JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY AND SANCTIONS 39-41 (1980), provides one example of "discounted"
sentences for young offenders parallel to those for adults. The Standards used adult
sentence lengths to establish substantive proportionality, classified all crimes into five
categories based on the level of punishment attached to them, and then provided for
substantially shorter equivalent juvenile sanctions. Other groups endorse similar dis-
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below the age of fourteen, the common law infancy mens rea de-
fense would acquire new vitality for proportionally shorter "dis-
counted" sentences or even non-criminal dispositions.
The rationale for a "youth discount" also supports requiring
a higher in/out threshold of offense seriousness as a prerequi-
site for imprisonment. Because juveniles depend upon their
families more than do adults, removal from home constitutes a
more severe punishment. Because of differences in "subjective
time," youths experience the duration of imprisonment more
acutely than do adults. Because of the rapidity of developmen-
tal change, sentences of incarceration are more disruptive for
youths than for adults. Thus, states should require a higher
threshold of offense seriousness and a greater need for social
defense before confining a youth than might be warranted for
an older offender.
The specific discount value-the amount of fractional re-
duction and the in/out threshold-reflects several empirical
and normative considerations. It requires an empirically-
informed sentencing policy judgment about adolescent devel-
opment and criminal responsibility. To what extent do specific
physical, social, and psychological characteristics of youth-de-
preciation of future consequences, risk-taking, peer influences,
lack of self-control, hormonal changes, and lack of opportuni-
ties to learn to make responsible choices-induce them to en-
gage in behavior simply because they are young? How much
developmental difference should a state require to produce
what degree of moral and legal mitigation in its sentencing pol-
icy? To what extent will severe, unmitigated adult penalties so
alter youths' life course that they will be unable to survive the
mistakes of adolescence with any semblance of life chances in-
tact? Developmental psychological research provides only sug-
gestive directions rather than definitive answers to these
sentencing policy questions.
counted penalties. See, e.g., CONFRONTING YOLTH CRIME, supra note 59, at 17 ("The
principle of diminished responsibility makes life imprisonment and death penalties
inappropriate," for example, even in cases of intentional murders by youths.); MODEL
PENAL CODE § 6.05 commentary at 25 (Tentative Draft No. 7, 1957) (recommending
special provisions for "young adult offenders," ages 16 to 22, with a maximum sentence
length of four years. The "special sentence should relate to the duration of commit-
ment ... adapted to the age of the offender.") (emphasis added).
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Only the states whose criminal sentencing laws provide real-
istic, humane, and determinate sentences that enable a judge
actually to determine "real-time" sentences can readily imple-
ment a proposal for explicit fractional reductions of youths' sen-
tences.3 6 One can only know the value of a "youth discounted"
sentence in a sentencing system in which courts know in ad-
vance the standard or "going rate" for adults. In many jurisdic-
tions, implementing a "youth discount" would require
significant modification of the current criminal sentencing stat-
utes including presumptive sentencing guidelines with strong
upper limits on punishment severity, elimination of all manda-
tory minimum sentences, and some structured judicial discre-
tion to mitigate penalties based on individual circumstances. In
short, a criminal sentencing system itself must be defensible in
terms of equality, equity, desert, and proportionality. Attempts
to apply idiosyncratically "youth discounts" within the flawed in-
determinate or draconian mandatory-minimum sentencing re-
gimes that currently prevail in many jurisdictions runs the risk
simply of reproducing all of their existing inequalities and injus-
tices.
1. Individualization vs. Categorization
Youthful development is highly variable. Young people of
the same age may differ dramatically in their criminal sophisti-
cation, appreciation of risk, or learned responsibility. Chrono-
logical age provides, at best, a crude and imprecise indicator of
maturity and the opportunity to develop a capacity for self-
control. However, a categorical "youth discount" that uses age
as a conclusive proxy for reduced culpability and a shorter sen-
tence remains preferable to an "individualized" inquiry into the
criminal responsibility of each young offender. The criminal
law represents an objective standard. Attempts to integrate sub-
jective psychological explanations of adolescent behavior and
personal responsibility into a youth sentencing policy cannot be
done in a way that can be administered fairly without undermin-
ing the objectivity of the law. Developmental psychology does
not possess reliable clinical indicators of moral development or
"6 See, e.g., MIcHAELToNRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 159-64 (1996); ToNRY, supra note
51, at 190-209; Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Reform in Minnesota, Ten Years After, 75
MINN. L. REv. 727, 729 (1991); Michael Tonry, Prediction and Classification: Legal and
Ethical Issues, 9 CRimE &JusT. 367 (1987).
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criminal sophistication that equate readily with criminal respon-
sibility or accountability.,3 7 For young criminal actors who pos-
sess at least some degree of criminal responsibility, relying upon
inherently inconclusive or contradictory psychiatric or clinical
testimony to precisely tailor sanctions hardly seems worth the
judicial burden and diversion of resources that the effort would
entail.'38 Thus, for ease of administration, age alone provides
the most useful criterion upon which to allocate mitigation.
Youthful mitigation of criminal responsibility represents a
legal concept and social policy judgment that does not corre-
spond with any psychiatric diagnostic category or developmental
psychological analogue about which an expert could testify.
Unlike the insanity defense, i' 9 a "youth discount" does not at-
tempt to assess whether antecedent forces, such as a mental ill-
ness, caused or determined a young offender's behavior.
Rather, it conclusively presumes that young people's criminal
choices differ qualitatively per se, from those of adults. "Youth-
fulness" constitutes a form of legal "partial responsibility" with-
out need for any specific clinical indicators other than a birth
certificate. A "youth discount" that bases fractional reductions
of sentences on age-as-a-proxy-for culpability also avoids the
conceptual and administrative difficulties of a more encompass-
ing subjective inquiry into diminished responsibility, 140 a "rotten
137 See, e.g., Grisso, supra note 80, at 235; Scott et al., supra note 76, at 1630.
' The administrative experiences with the insanity and diminished responsibility
defenses in the criminal law, and with "amenability to treatment" in judicial waiver
proceedings teach that efforts to individualize culpability assessments necessarily
founder on clinical subjectivity, differences among experts about symptomology and
their effects on choices, the inability of juries or judges rationally and consistently to
assess culpability, and uncertainty about the penal purposes being advanced by the
inquiry. See; e.g., Goldstein & Katz, supra note 56, at 865; Peter Arenella, The Dimin-
ished Capacity and Diminished Responsibility Defenses: Two Children of a Doomed Marriage,
77 COLUM. L. REv. 827 (1977); StephenJ. Morse, Undiminished Confusion in Diminished
Capacity, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMNOLOGY 1 (1984); Feld, Vwlent Youth, supra note 2, at
1006-10.
"' See supra note 56 and accompanying text (discussing the insanity defense).
Arenella, supra note 138, at 835-36. Although "diminished responsibility" doc-
trines attempt to link a sane defendant's mental abnormality with some reduced de-
gree of criminal responsibility, efforts to evaluate subjective culpability result in
inconsistent, confusing, and arbitrary applications. Diminished responsibility allows
the defendant to introduce psychological evidence about why he was less responsible
than an ordinary person as a formal mitigation of punishment, although it is unclear
to what legal formula that evidence corresponds. Id. at 835-36. See also Morse, supra
note 138, at 9-13.
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social background,"141 or "social adversity."42 Defenses that rec-
ognize deficiencies of character as excuses to criminal liability
undermine the value of responsibility and encourage determi-
nistic claims of lack of culpability. The juvenile courts' treat-
ment ideology mistakenly denies that young people are morally
responsible actors whom the law may hold accountable for their
behavior.
A youth sentencing policy requires formal mitigation to
avoid the undesirable forced choice between either inflicting
undeservedly harsh punishments on less culpable actors or "do-
ing nothing" about the manifestly guilty. Mitigation avoids the
pressures judges and juries historically experienced to nullify
and acquit the "somewhat guilty" or to punish excessively the
"partially" responsible. A formal policy of youthful mitigation
provides a buffer against the inevitable political pressure to
ratchet-up sanctions every time youths sentenced leniently sub-
sequently commit serious offenses. The idea of deserved pun-
ishment also limits the imposition of too little punishment as well
as too much. Although the overall cardinal scale of penalties
for juveniles should be considerably less than that for adults, a
failure to sanction when appropriate, as juvenile court treat-
ment ideology may dictate in some instances, can deprecate the
moral seriousness of offending.4 3 Indeed juvenile court judges
de facto reinstate the principle of offense and punish young of-
fenders exactly because a treatment ideology cannot justify ei-
ther "clinically" lenient or disparate, individualized sentences.
"4 Richard Delgado, "Rotten Social Background: Should Criminal Law Recognize a De-
fense of Severe Environmental Deprivation?, 3 J.L. & INEQUALrnr 9, 15 (1982). A "rotten
social background" defense posits that a person raised in a manifestly criminogenic
environment-grinding deprivation and poverty, minimal parental or familial sup-
port, exposure to violence and abuse, tutelage in crime by older youths "on the
street"-cannot make the same moral choices as those born in more advantageous
circumstances and should not be held to the same degree of criminal responsibility.
142 TONRY, supra note 51, at 141. Tonry notes that recognizing a "social adversity"
defense denigrates those offenders by implying that "those people are not responsible
adults whose moral choices matter." Id. at 141-42. Since recognition of moral auton-
omy entails acknowledgment of people's responsibility for their willed actions, a so-
cial adversity defense cutting that link would deny the actor's autonomy. Id. at 142-
43. Tonry also argues that formal recognition of "social adversity" as an excuse would
stigmatize all members of the disadvantaged class to whom the defense might be
available, remove disincentives to engage in crime, and undermine the objectivity and
deterrent functions of criminal law. Id. at 146-47.
'4 Feld, Juvenile Waiver Statutes, supra note 1, at 527-28.
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2. Youth and Group Crime
Young offenders commit crimes in groups to a much
greater extent than do adults.'" While the law treats all partici-
pants in a crime as equally responsible and may sentence them
alike, young people's susceptibility to peer group influences re-
quires a more nuanced assessment of their degree of participa-
tion, personal responsibility, and culpability.'4 The group
nature of youth crime affects sentencing policy in several ways.
The presence of a social audience of peers may induce youths to
participate in criminal behavior that they would not engage in if
alone.14 6 Even though the criminal law treats all accomplices as
equally guilty as a matter of law, they may not all bear equal re-
sponsibility for the actual harm inflicted and may deserve differ-
ent sentences. 4 7 To some extent, state criminal sentencing laws
already recognize an offender's differential participation in a
crime as a "mitigating" factor. 48 Similarly, some states' juvenile
court waiver laws and juvenile sentencing provisions also focus
on "the culpability of the child in committing the alleged of-
fense, including the level of the child's participating in planning
and carrying out the offense ... .,,9 Thus, the group nature of
adolescent criminality requires some formal mechanism to dis-
4 Zimring, supra note 106, at 880; SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 2, at 49.
"' Zimring, supra note 106, at 883 ("The pervasive problem of the adolescent ac-
cessory aggravates the difficulty of determining appropriate sanctions for youth
crime."). Zimring contends that currently, prosecutors' charging decisions and juve-
nile court judges' sentencing decisions attempt to distinguish between a "reluctant
but voluntary" aider and abettor and youths who bear primary responsibility. Id. at
883-84.
"' See generally DAVID MATZA, BECOMING DEVIANT (1969) (as a result of "pluralistic
ignorance" or "shared misunderstanding," youths attribute to other members of their
group a greater propensity to deviance and participate in delinquency in order to
avoid "losing face."); JAMES SHORT & FRED STRODBECK, GROUP PROCESS AND GANG
DELINQUENCY (1965) (group nature of youth crime and encouragement each pro-
vides the other).
,7 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 609.05 (1992) (aiding and abetting liability of accom-
plices). State criminal laws and court opinions do not require juvenile courts to dis-
tinguish between active and "passive" accomplices either to transfer youths to
criminal courts, see, e.g., In re K.C., 513 N.W.2d 18, 21 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994); In re
T.L.C., 435 N.W.2d 581, 583 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989), or to sentence them asjuveniles,
In re D.KK., 410 N.W. 2d 76, 77 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
1'4 See, e.g., MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § II.D.2.a.(2) (1996) (mitigating factor
that "offender played a minor or passive role" in crime).
"
9 MINN. STAT. § 260.125(2b) (1992). See generally Feld, Violent Youth, supra note 2,
at 1031-34.
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tinguish between active participants and passive accomplices
with even greater "discounts" for the latter.
3. Virtue of Affirming Partial Responsibility for Youth
In the Broadway musical, West Side Story, The Jets sing the
song, "Gee Officer Krupke," in which they invoke many of the
popular deterministic explanations of delinquency. One boy
complains that "Our mothers all are junkies, Our fathers all are
drunks," and the chorus responds that 'We never had the love
that every child ought a get." Another youth observes that he's
"depraved on account I'm deprived," and others' self-diagnoses
conclude that '"e are sick, sick, sick, Like we're sociologically
sick." One boy prescribes "a analyst's care! It just his neurosis
that ought a be curbed-He's psychologically disturbed."10 In
short, the delinquents readily understood cultural explanations
of criminality, invoked exculpatory appeals to determinism, and
employed "techniques of neutralization" to relieve themselves of
responsibility for their behavior.
1 5
'
One of the principal virtues, Goldstein argues in his seminal
defense of The Insanity Defense, is that it dramatically affirms the
idea of individual responsibility.52  Because the criminal law
emphasizes blame, the insanity defense attempts to distinguish
between the "mad" and the "bad," between the "sick" and the
"evil," in order to reinforce the concept of personal responsibil-
ity153 The idea of personal responsibility and holding people ac-
countable for their behavior provides an important counter-
weight to a popular culture that endorses the idea that everyone
is a victim, that all behavior is determined and no one is respon-
sible, and that therefore the state cannot blame wrong-doers.
" STE VEN SONDHEIM, WEsr SinE STORY 114-16 (1956).
.., See, e.g., Gresham M. Sykes & David Matza, Techniques of Neutralization: A Theory of
Delinquency, 22 AM. Soc. REv. 664 (1957); DAViD MATA, DELINQUENCYAND DRFT 69-98
(1964).
,12 ABRAHAM S. GoLDsTE'N, THE INSANTY DEFENSE 224-25 (1967).
15' &n
1.4 Packer argues that regardless of how psychologists or philosophers ultimately
resolve the "free will versus determinism" debate, it is desirable to act "as if' responsi-
ble people make choices:
The idea of free will in relation to conduct is not, in the legal system, a statement
of fact, but rather a value preference having very little to do with the metaphysics
of determinism and free will .... Very simply, the law treats man's conduct as
autonomous and willed, not because it is, but because it is desirable to proceed
as if it were. It is desirable because the capacity of the individual human being to
live his life in reasonable freedom from socially imposed external constraints...
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The juvenile court's "rehabilitative ideal" elevated determin-
ism over free will, characterized delinquent offenders as victims
rather than perpetrators, and envisioned a therapeutic institu-
tion that resembled more closely a preventive, forward-looking
civil commitment process rather than a criminal court. By deny-
ing youths' personal responsibility, juvenile courts' treatment
ideology reduces offenders' duty to exercise self-control, erodes
their obligation to change, and sustains a self-fulfilling prophecy
that delinquency occurs inevitably for youths from certain back-
grounds.
Affirming responsibility encourages people to learn the vir-
tues of moderation, self-discipline, and personal accountability.
Acknowledging that we punish young offenders for their mis-
conduct
becomes part of a complex of cultural forces that keep alive the moral
lessons, and the myths, which are essential to the continued order of so-
ciety. In short, even if we have misgiving about blaming a particular in-
dividual, because he has been shaped long ago by forces he may no
longer be able to resist, the concept of "blame" may be necessary.
Because a criminal conviction represents an official condemna-
tion, the idea of "blame" reinforces for the public and provides
for the individual the incentive to develop responsibility. A cul-
ture that values autonomous individuals must emphasize both
freedom and responsibility.
While the paternalistic stance of the traditional juvenile
courts rests on the humane desire to protect young people from
the adverse consequences of their bad decisions, protectionism
simultaneously disables young people from the opportunity to
make choices and to learn responsibility for their natural con-
sequences. Even marginally competent adolescents can only
learn self-control by exercising their capacity for autonomy. Ac-
countability for criminal behavior may facilitate legal socializa-
tion and moral development in ways that juvenile courts'
rejection of criminal responsibility cannot.
would be fatally impaired unless the law provided a locus poenitentiae, a point of
no return beyond which external constraints may be imposed but before which
the individual is free-not free of whatever compulsions determinists tell us he la-
bors under but free of the very specific social compulsions of the law.
HERBERT PACKER, THE IMITS OF THE CRuNAL SANCCION 74-75 (1968).
"' GoLDsIN, supra note 152, at 224.
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4. Integrated Criminal Justice System
A graduated age-culpability sentencing scheme in an inte-
grated criminal justice system avoids the inconsistencies and in-
justices associated with the binary either-juvenile-or-adult drama
currently played out in judicial waiver proceedings and in
prosecutorial charging decisions. It also avoids the "punish-
ment gap" when youths make the transition from the one justice
system to the other. Depending upon whether or not ajudge or
prosecutor transfers a case, the sentences that violent youths re-
ceive may differ by orders of magnitude. Moreover, appellate
courts eschew proportionality analyses and allow criminal court
judges to sentence waived youths to the same terms applied to
adults without requiring them to consider or recognize any dif-
ferences in their degree of criminal responsibility. By contrast,
waived chronic property offenders typically receive less severe
sanctions as adults than they would have received as persistent
offenders in the juvenile system. As the sentencing principles of
juvenile courts increasingly resemble more closely those of
criminal courts, the sentence disparities that follow from waiver
decisions become even less defensible. Because of the "life and
death" consequences at stake, transfer hearings consume a dis-
proportionate amount ofjuvenile court time and energy.
An integrated criminal justice system eliminates the need
for transfer hearings, saves the considerable resources that ju-
venile courts currently expend ultimately to no purpose, re-
duces the "punishment gap" that presently occurs when youths
make the passage from the juvenile system, and assures similar
consequences for similarly situated offenders. Adolescence and
criminal careers develop along a continuum. But the radical bi-
furcation between the two justice systems confounds efforts to
respond consistently and systematically to young career offend-
ers.
A sliding-scale of criminal sentences based on an offender's
age-as-a-proxy-for-culpability accomplishes much more directly
what the various "blended jurisdiction" statutes attempt to
achieve indirectly. The variants of "intermediate" sanctions at-
tempt to reconcile the binary alternatives of either a sentence
limited by juvenile court age jurisdiction or a dramatically
longer criminal sentence imposed upon a youth as an adult.
While those statutes attempt to smooth the juncture between
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the two systems, the existence of two separate systems thwarts
the fusion.
5. Integrated Record Keeping
The absence of an integrated record keeping system that
enables criminal court judges to identify and respond to career
offenders on the basis of their cumulative prior record consti-
tutes one of the most pernicious consequences of jurisdictional
bifurcation. Currently, persistent young offenders may "fall be-
tween the cracks" of the juvenile and criminal systems, often at
the age at which career offenders approach their peak offend-
ing rates. A unified criminal court with a single record keeping
system can maintain and retrieve more accurate criminal histo-
ries when a judge sentences an offender.'56 Although a "youth
discount" provides appropriate leniency for younger offenders,
integrated records would allow courts to escalate the discounted
sanctions for chronic and career young offenders.
6. Decriminalize "Kids' Stuff'
Despite juvenile courts' overcrowded dockets and inade-
quate treatment resources, their procedural deficiencies and in-
formality allow them to process delinquents too efficiently.
Expedited procedures, fewer lawyers and legal challenges, and
greater flexibility allows juvenile courts to handle a much larger
number of cases per judge than do criminal courts and at lower
unit cost.' Merging the two systems would introduce an enor-
mous volume of cases into an already over-burdened criminal
justice system that barely can cope with its current workload.
Legislators and prosecutors forced to allocate scarce law en-
"' State laws can relieve young offenders from the collateral consequence of an iso-
lated criminal conviction. Some research indicates that an arrest record and criminal
justice system involvement adversely affects youths' employment prospects and fur-
ther restricts their access to legitimate labor markets. LOOSING GENERATIONS, supra
note 46, at 166; MERCER L. SULuVAN, "GETtiNG PAID": YOUTH CRIME AND WORK IN THE
INNER Cnr 251-55 (1989); Richard B. Freeman, Employment and Earnings of Disadvan-
taged Youth in a Labor Shortage Economy, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 103 (Christopher
Jencks & Paul Peterson eds., 1991). Although criminal sentencing authorities require
access to records of prior convictions to identify chronic and career offenders,
younger first offenders need not suffer all of the disabilities and losses of rights typi-
cally associated with criminal convictions. A legislature can nullify the effects of a fel-
ony conviction upon completion of sentence and supervision.
117 SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 2, at 132-37; Feld, Viwlent Youth, supra note 2, at
1097-21.
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forcement resources would use the seriousness of the offense to
rationalize charging decisions and "divert" or "decriminalize"
most of the "kids' stuff' that provides the grist of the juvenile
court mill until it became chronic or escalated in severity.158 Un-
like a rehabilitative system inclined to extend its benevolent
reach, an explicitly punitive process would opt to introduce
fewer and more criminally "deserving" youths into the system.
Z SentencingExpertise
Contemporary proponents of a specialized juvenile court
contend that juvenile court judges require substantial time and
commitment to become familiar with youth development, fam-
ily dynamics, and community resources, and cite judges' disposi-
tional expertise as a justification for a separate justice system. 9
Whether juvenile court judges actually acquire such expertise
remains unclear. In many jurisdictions, non-specialist judges
handle juvenile matters as part of their general trial docket or
rotate through a juvenile court on short term assignments with-
out developing any special expertise in sentencing juveniles.1 °
Even in specialized juvenile courts, the court services personnel,
rather than the judge herself, typically possess the information
necessary to recommend appropriate sentences.
" Compare Feld, Niolent Youth, supra note 2, at 1108-21 (state statute extends non-
waivable right to counsel to juveniles), with Melissa M. Weldon, Note, Fiscal Restraints
Trump Due Process: Children's Diminishing Right to Counsel in Minnesota, 14 LAW & INEQ.
J. 647, 668 (1996) (after law guaranteed representation by counsel, legislature
amended statute and "decriminalized" juvenile misdemeanors as a cost-saving strat-
egy). The well-documented phenomenon of "desistance" suggests that most young
offenders spontaneously abandon their tentative criminal involvements and accounts
for most of the "success" of diversion and informal probation. See MARVIN WOLFGANG
ETAL., DEINQUENCYINABIRTH COHORT (1972).
'5' See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 54, at 36.
" Rubin, supra note 52, at 296; see also Edwards, supra note 54. An integrated
criminal court that functions primarily as a court of law reduces the need for a spe-
cialized judiciary trained in principles of social work. Trying young people with full
procedural safeguards would not especially diminish judges' expertise about appro-
priate dispositions for young people. Even if a court convicts a youth, probation staff
may conduct a presentence investigation and advise the judge as to the appropriate
sentence. Within the range of sentence lengths determined by the offense and re-
duced by the "youth discount," courts still could provide young offenders with what-
ever social or welfare services they deem appropriate.
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8. Age-segregated Dispositional Facilities and "Room to Reform"
Questions about young offenders' criminal responsibility
and length of sentence differ from issues about appropriate
places of confinement or the services or resources the state
should provide to them. Even explicitly punitive sentences do
not require judges or correctional authorities to confine young
people with adults in jails and prisons, as is the current practice
for waived youths, 161 or to consign them to custodial warehouses
or "punk prisons." States should maintain separate age-
segregated youth correctional facilities to protect both younger
offenders and older inmates. Even though youths may be
somewhat responsible for their criminal conduct, they may not
be the physical or psychological equals of adults in prison.
While some youths may be vulnerable to victimization or exploi-
tation by more physically developed adults, other youths may
pose a threat to older inmates. Younger offenders have not
learned to "do easy time," pose more management problems for
correctional administrators, and commit more disciplinary in-
fractions while they serve their sentences. 62  Existing juvenile
detention facilities, training schools, and institutions provide
the option to segregate inmates on the basis of age or other risk
factors. Some research indicates that youths sentenced to juve-
nile correctional facilities may recidivate somewhat less often,
seriously, or rapidly than comparable youths sentenced to adult
facilities.63 However, these findings provide modest support for
161 See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text; TORBET ET AL., supra note 16, at
25-27.
162 A study of prison rule violations reported that "[a] ge was the prisoner character-
istic that related most directly to prison rule violation... [and] the younger the age
category, the larger the percentage of inmates charged with rule violations." BUREAU
OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISON RULE VIOLATORS 2 (1989). See also LIS, INC., OFFENDERS
UNDERAGE 18 IN STATE ADULT CORRECTIONAL SYSTEMS: A NATIONAL PICTURE 4 (1995).
One study of prison adjustment compared a sample of waived youths sentenced to
the Texas Department of Corrections for violent crimes committed before the age of
17 with a matched sample of incarcerated inmates aged 17 to 21 at the time of their
offenses. By every measure, the waived violent youths adapted less well, accumulated
more extensive disciplinary histories, earned less good time, experienced higher cus-
tody classification, committed more assaults, and required extra security measures.
Marilyn D. McShane & Frank P. Williams, III, The Prison Adjustment ofJuvenile Offend-
ers, 35 CRIME & DELINQ. 254 (1989).
6' SeeJeffrey Fagan, Separating the Men from the Boys: The Comparative Advantage ofJu-
venile Versus Criminal Court Sanctions on Recidivism among Adolescent Felony Offenders, in A
SOURCEBOOK: SERIOUS, VIOLENT, AND CHRONIC JUVENILE OFFENDERS 238 (James C.
Howell et al. eds., 1995); Lawrence Winner et al., The Transfer ofJuveniles to Criminal
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a separate youth correctional system rather than for an entirely
separate juvenile justice system.
Virtually all young offenders return to society, and the state
should provide them with resources for self-improvement on a
voluntary basis because of its basic responsibility to its citizens
and its own self-interest. If a state fails to provide opportunities
for growth and further debilitates already disadvantaged youths,
it guarantees greater long-term human, criminal, and correc-
tional costs. A sentencing and correctional policy that offers
young offenders "room to reform," opportunities, and resources
does not covertly reinstate a treatment ideology, but facilitates
young offenders' constructive use of their time. With maturity,
most young offenders develop a capacity for self-control and de-
sist from criminality. Providing them with opportunities to re-
form requires more than custodial warehousing. Education,
social services, and economic training may contribute to per-
sonal growth and perhaps improve the life chances of adoles-
cents at risk even if they do not demonstrably reduce recidivism
rates. Although the state bears an obligation to provide the
means and incentives for personal change, the length of a
youth's sentence should not depend fundamentally on either
clinically perceived "real needs" or apparent responsiveness to
"coerced treatment."16
V. SUMMARYAND CONCLUSIONS:
LET'S BE HONEST ABOUTYOUTH CRIME CONTROL
Law reforms that tinker with the boundaries of childhood
or modify judicial procedures do not appear to reduce appre-
ciably offenders' probabilities of recidivism or increase public
Court: Reexamining Recidivism Over the Longer Term, 43 CRIME & DEuNQ. 548 (1997)
(long-term recidivism survival analysis reported that police rearrested transferred ju-
veniles more quickly and more often than retained juveniles); Donna Bishop et al.,
The Transfer ofJuveniles to Criminal Court: Does It Make a Difference?, 42 CRIME & DEuNQ.
171 (1996) (comparison of recidivism rates of waived youths with matched sample of
retained juveniles reported more favorable outcomes for the latter); Jeffrey Fagan,
The Comparative Advantage of Juvenile Versus Criminal Court Sanctions on Recidivism
Among Felony Offenders, 18 LAW & POLY 77 (1996) (compared recidivism rates of 15
and 16-year-old robbery and burglary offenders sentenced as adults in New York with
a comparable sample of youths sentenced as juveniles in contiguous counties in New
Jersey).
"' One can uncouple social welfare from criminal social control, and divorce
treatment from punishment only by providing the opportunity for change on a volun-
tary basis. See.AMERICAN FR]ENDS SERVICE CoMM., STRuGGLE FORJuSnCE 171 (1997).
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safety. Even far-reaching justice system changes can have only a
marginal impact on social problems as complex as crime and
violence. Rather, a proposal to abolish the juvenile court and to
try all young offenders in an integrated justice system makes no
utilitarian claims, but represents a commitment to honesty
about state coercion. States bring young offenders who commit
crimes to juvenile court for social control and to punish them.
Juvenile courts' rehabilitative claims fly in the face of their penal
reality, undermine their legitimacy, and impair their ability to
function as judicial agencies. Because punishment is an un-
pleasant topic, juvenile courts attempt to evade those disagree-
able qualities by obscuring their reality with rehabilitative
euphemisms, psycho-babble, and judicial "double-speak" like
"sometimes punishment is treatment."
The shortcomings of the "rehabilitative" juvenile court run
far deeper than inadequate resources and rudimentary and un-
proven treatment techniques. Rather, the flaw lies in the very
idea that the juvenile court can combine successfully criminal
social control and social welfare in one system. Similarly, a
separate "criminal" juvenile court cannot succeed or long sur-
vive because it lacks a coherent rationale to distinguish it from a
"real" criminal court.'6 A scaled-down separate criminal court
for youths simply represents a temporary way-station on the
road to substantive and procedural convergence with the crimi-
nal court. Only an integrated criminal justice that formally rec-
ognizes adolescence as a developmental continuum may
effectively address many of the problems created by our binary
conceptions of youth and social control.
Enhanced procedural protections, a "youth discount" of
sentences, and age-segregated dispositional facilities recognize
and respond to the "real" developmental differences between
young people and adult offenders in the justice system. Because
these policy proposals require state legislators courageous
enough to adopt them, several thoughtful commentators ques-
tion whether elected public officials in a "get tough" political
climate would make explicit the leniency implicit in the con-
165 See, e.g., Rosenberg, supra note 52, at 182-85; Melton, supra note 34, at 177-80
(proposing a "criminal" juvenile court with adult procedural safeguards and shorter
sentences in a separate justice system).
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temporary juvenile court.1r While the public unknowingly may
tolerate nominal sanctions administered to young offenders in
low visibility juvenile proceedings, politicians may balk at openly
acknowledging a policy of moderation. Many elected officials
prefer to demagogue about crime and posture politically to
"crack down" on youth crime rather than to responsibly educate
the public about the realistic limits of the justice system to con-
trol it. Some would rather fan the flames of fear for political
advantage despite overwhelming evidence that escalating rates
of imprisonment represent a failed policy that ultimately leads
only to fiscal and moral bankruptcy.
I propose to abolish the juvenile court with trepidation. On
the one hand, combining enhanced procedural safeguards with
a "youth discount" in an integrated criminal court can provide
young offenders with greater protections and justice than they
currently receive in the juvenile system, and more proportional
and humane consequences than judges presently inflict on
them in the criminal justice system. Integration may foster a
more consistent crime control response than the present dual
systems permit to violent and chronic young offenders at various
stages of the developmental and criminal career continuum.
On the other hand, politicians may ignore the significance of
youthfulness as a mitigating factor and use these proposals to
escalate the punishment of young people. Although abolition
of the juvenile court, enhanced procedural protections, and a
"youth discount" constitute essential components of a youth
sentencing policy package,167 nothing can prevent legislators
from selectively choosing only those elements that serve their
"get tough" agenda, even though doing so unravels the threads
that make coherent a proposal for an integrated court.
In either event, the ensuing debate about a youth sentenc-
ing policy would require them to consider whether to focus
primarily on the fact that young offenders are young or offenders.
A public policy debate about when the child is a criminal and
"' Rosenberg, for example, questions whether legislators who fail to provide juve-
niles even with procedural parity in the current "benevolent" juvenile justice system
would provide youths with greater safeguards after they merged them into a unified
criminal system. Rosenberg, supra note 52, at 175. Bernard argues that a policy of
leniency as crime control would be difficult to sell to "law and order" politicians.
THOM.sJ. BERNARD, CYCLE OFJUv ENELEJuScE 181-82 (1992).
"' Feld, Violent Youth, supra note 2, at 1004.
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the criminal is a child forces a long overdue and critical reas-
sessment of the entire social construction of "childhood." To
what extent do adolescents really differ from adults? To what
extent do differences in competency and judgment result from
physical or psychological developmental processes, or from so-
cial arrangements and institutions that systematically disable
young people? If politicians ultimately insist upon treating
young people primarily as offenders and the equals of adults,
can they simultaneously maintain without contradiction other
age-graded legal distinctions such as denial of the right to vote
or to exercise self-determination?
The idea of the juvenile court is fundamentally flawed be-
cause it attempts to combine criminal social control and social
welfare goals. My proposal to abolish the juvenile court does
not entail an abandonment of its welfare ideal. Rather, uncou-
pling policies of social welfare from penal social control enables
us to expand a societal commitment to the welfare of all chil-
dren regardless of their criminality. If we frame child welfare
policy reforms in terms of child welfare rather than crime con-
trol, then we may expand the possibilities for positive interven-
tion for all young people. For example, a public health
approach to youth crime that identified the social, environ-
mental, community structural, and ecological correlates of
youth violence, such as poverty, the proliferation of handguns,
and the commercialization of violence, would suggest wholly
different intervention strategies than simply incarcerating mi-
nority youths. Youth violence occurs as part of a social ecologi-
cal structure; high rates of violent youth crime arise in areas of
concentrated poverty, high teenage pregnancy, and AFDC de-
pendency.'6 Such social indicators could identify census tracts
or even zip-codes for community organizing, economic devel-
opment, and preventive and remedial intervention.
Three aspects of youth crime and violence suggest future
social welfare policy directions regardless of their immediate
impact on recidivism. First, it is imperative to provide a hopeful
future for all young people. As a result of structural and economic
changes since the 1980s, the ability of families to raise children,
See generally WHILAMJULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS (1996); DOUGLAS
MASSEY & NANCY DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID (1993); LOSING GENERATIONS, supra
note 46; WILLIAMJULUUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED (1987).
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to prepare them for the transition to adulthood, and to provide
them with a more promising future has declined.169 Many social
indicators of the status of young people-poverty, homelessness,
violent victimization, and crime-are negative and some of
those adverse trends are accelerating. Without realistic hope
for their future, young people fall into despair, nihilism, and
violenceY.17  Second, the disproportionate over-representation of
minority youths in the juvenile justice system makes imperative
the pursuit of racial and social justice. A generation ago, the
Kerner Commission warned that the United States was "moving
toward two societies, one black, one white-separate and une-
qual.' 7' The Kerner Commission predicted that to continue
present policies was "to make permanent the division of our
country into two societies; one, largely Negro and poor, located
in the central cities; the other, predominantly white and afflu-
ent, located in the suburbs." 72 Today, we reap the bitter harvest
of racial segregation, concentrated poverty, urban social disin-
tegration, and youth violence sown by social policies and public
neglect a generation ago.73 Third, youth violence has become
increasingly lethal as the proliferation of handguns transforms
adolescent altercations into homicidal encounters. 7 4 Only pub-
lic policies that reduce and reverse the proliferation of guns in
the youth population will stem the carnage.
While politicians may be unwilling to invest scarce social re-
sources in young "criminals," particularly those of other colors
or cultures, a demographic shift and an aging population give
all of us a stake in young people and encourage us to invest in
'69 See generally BEYOND RHEToRIc, supra note 47; LOSING GENERATIONS, supra note
46.
170 BEYOND RHETORIC, supra note 47; Grisso, supra note 80, at 234 (summarizing re-
search on youth violence by noting that "[n]umerous studies describe the sense of
'futurelessness' and fatalism that is experienced by adolescents whose dependent
status does not allow them to escape neighborhoods in which violent death is a daily
occurrence, and they consider that many urban youths who murder believe that there
is no future to consider.").
171 REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 1 (1968)
(Kemer Commission Report).
"7 WILSON, TRULY DISADVANTAGED, supra note 168; MASSEY & DENTON, supra note
168.
'74Young people committed three-quarters of homicides with firearms, and only a
policy of systematic disarmament will begin to stem the tide. See generally Blumstein,
supra note 22; Blumstein & Cork, supra note 22; Zimring, supra note 22.
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their human capital for their and our own future well-being and
to maintain an inter-generational compact.' 5 Social welfare and
legal policies to provide all young people with a hopeful future,
to reduce racial and social inequality, and to reduce access to
and use of firearms require a public and political commitment
to the welfare of children that extends far beyond the resources
or competencies of any juvenile justice system.
17" One generation ago, the elderly constituted the largest segment of the popula-
tion in poverty, and public policies such as social security, SSI, and medicare dramati-
cally improved their material conditions. Today, children constitute the largest
segment of the population in poverty, and the youngest, minorities, and those living
in single-parent families experience the greatest penury. See LOSING GENERATIONS, su-
pra note 46, at 41-63. Social security-like public policies can provide for child health
and welfare, lift young people out of poverty, and ease the transition from adoles-
cence to productive adulthood for considerably less than the annual costs of "bailing
out" the savings and loan industry. See LaNDSEY, supra note 47, at 229-56.
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